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A Brief History of Health Expenditures in the U.S. 
Americans are spending an increasing proportion of their incomes on 
health expenditures. As shown in Figure 1 in Appendix B, health expenditures 
were only 5.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960. By 1987, health 
expenditures had increased to 11 percent of GDP. During the same twenty seven 
year period, healthcare costs in the U.S. have continually increased, as shown in 
Figure 2. The lowest rate of growth in medical costs for any year in that period 
was the 1 percent increase in 1963. The highest rate of growth in medical costs 
for any year in that period was approximately 11.3 percent in 1981. More 
importantly, for every year for the past fifteen years, medical costs have risen at a 
rate greater than the general inflation rate. In 1987, medical costs rose at a rate 
that was nearly twice that of the inflation rate. The continually rising cost of 
medical care in the United States has made it increasingly difficult for individuals 
to afford medical care. Approximately 36 million Americans, 15 percent of the 
population, had no health insurance in 1991 (Thompson (1992) p.18). 
Policymakers must make new policies or modify old policies to assure that 
healthcare is affordable to the average American. 
1 
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The Role of Competition in Determining Hospital Charges 
Policymakers need to understand how hospital markets operate in order to 
reduce the rate of growth of hospital costs. In particular, it's important for them 
to know how hospitals react to competition. On one hand, competition could 
reduce hospital charges to marginal cost making consumers better off. In this 
case, vigorous enforcement of antitrust in hospital markets by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Justice Department would be likely to promote social 
welfare. On the other hand, hospitals may react to competition in a way that does 
not enhance consumer welfare. For example, insurance companies pay a large 
portion of patients' bills. Therefore, patients have a tendency to be sensitive to 
the quality element of a particular service and insensitive to the price element of 
a particular service. The end result is that competition among hospitals would 
actually increase quality and increase prices. If this is the case, the antitrust 
authorities may want to develop new policies for dealing with hospital markets. 
This paper explores the relationship between market structure and 
performance in hospital markets to determine which of the above descriptions 
best characterizes the way these markets work. The goal of this study is to 
provide valuable information to policymakers, judges, and others who deal with 
antitrust and regulatory matters involving hospitals. 
Overview 
This overview outlines the plan of attack for providing evidence on the 
relationship between competition and hospital charges. The dissertation begins 
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with the theoretical foundations of the relationship between market structure and 
performance. In this chapter, arguments are made for using hospital prices rather 
than other variables as measures of performance. Probably the strongest 
argument for using prices rather than some measure of profitability is that there is 
strong evidence that costs do not remain constant over different levels of market 
concentration. Thus, a firm in a highly concentrated market may be charging high 
prices and imposing a cost on society, but may actually have low profits if costs 
are positively related to concentration, e.g. if strong X-inefficiency exists. Chapter 
II also outlines the different views on the relationship between hospital prices and 
concentration. Unlike most industries, many economists believe that there is a 
negative relationship between hospital market concentration and prices. 
Chapter III presents the model in Noether (1987) that examines the 
relationship between hospital prices and concentration. The analysis presented 
here makes several changes to this model. First, this dissertation focuses on 
California rather than the whole U.S. In the 80's, the Reagan administration 
delegated many regulatory responsibilities to the states that was previously held by 
the Federal government. As a result, states have adopted a variety of policies to 
deal with the rising cost of medical care. Some states (Massachusetts for 
example), have taken considerable authority over hospitals' pricing. California, on 
the other hand, has embraced a market mechanism for reducing hospital costs, 
making it a suitable subject for this study. Second, this dissertation uses a 
geographic market definition as opposed to the S.M.S.A. market definition used 
by Noether. This definition depends upon the flow of hospital patients from 
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various zip codes. Therefore, the hospital markets can be quite small, as they 
tend to be for vaginal deliveries, or quite large, as they tend to be for kidney 
transplants. Third, this study uses data that are superior to those used by 
Noether. Noether used the MEDP AR data file, a 20 percent sample of all 
Medicare reimbursements. The prices that Medicare pays are no longer market 
determined since the Health Care Financing Administration's adoption of the 
prospective payment system. Thus the MEDP AR data are no longer appropriate 
for a price concentration study. However, the California Office of Statewide 
Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) records a large amount of detailed 
patient data that can be acquired by researchers. Unlike the MEDPAR data set 
which is derived from a 20 percent sample of Medicare payments, the California 
data set includes details from virtually all of the approximately 3 million 
discharges from California hospitals (Patient (1986) p.14). The OSHPD data set 
is also superior to the MEDP AR data set since there may be discrepancies 
between the prices hospitals charge to Medicare and those charged to the general 
public. 
Chapter IV reports the regression results, which tend to support the Maw 
Lin Lee Hypothesis (1971) that non-profit hospital managers seek higher status 
through improving quality of their hospitals. The higher level of quality, however, 
increases costs which drives up hospital prices. The end result is that higher 
competition results in increased hospital prices as hospital managers attempt to 
improve the status of their hospitals. The negative relationship between prices 
and concentration only holds true for some of the non-profit hospitals' markets. 
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On the other hand, a positive relationship between prices and concentration exists 
for many of the for-profit hospitals' markets and some of the non-profit hospitals' 
markets. In addition, there is a tendency for for-profit hospitals to charge higher 
prices than non-profit hospitals and for government hospitals to charge lower 
prices than non-profit hospitals. It is also found that hospitals that are members 
of a system are inclined to charge higher prices than non-system members, either 
signifying that system membership aids collusive activities, or that system members 
have a higher level of quality which stimulates demand. 
These results concerning market concentration certainly differ from the 
norm in most industries. However, as the upcoming pages demonstrate, the 
hospital industry is not a normal industry. Therefore, a careful study is necessary 





Economists have studied the relationship between market structure and 
performance for many years. In 1838 Augustin Cournot developed his famous 
model of oligopoly behavior. He assumed that each firm believed that its 
competitors' output decision would not change in response to its own output 
decision. The end result was that the prices and the profits of firms in a market 
were inversely related to the number of competitors. Over one hundred years 
later, George Stigler (1964) hypothesized that as the number of firms in an 
industry increased, it became more difficult for the conspiring firms to detect 
cheating. Therefore, as the number of firms in an oligopoly increased, the ability 
of firms to raise price above the competitive level diminished. Thus the theories 
developed in the past have provided an empirical question to be answered: Does 
market structure affect performance? 
Measures of Structure and Performance 
Researchers have used a number of measures of structure and performance. 
Market structure deals with the competitiveness of a market and is typically 
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represented in empirical studies by factors that facilitate collusion. Such factors 
include: the concentration of the market, barriers to entry, and buyer 
concentration (Carlton (1989) pp.368-370). One of the most common measures of 
market structure is the four-firm concentration ratio which sums the market 
shares of the four largest firms in an industry. Another commonly used measure 
of concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) which is the sum of 
the squared market shares of all firms in the market. The HHI is the foundation 
of current Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission rules for the 
evaluation of mergers. Market performance, on ~he other hand, refers to the 
outcome of the competitive process. Measures of profitability (e.g. rates of return 
and price-cost margins) or the separate components of profits such as prices and 
expenditures are common measures of performance. 
While the theories of Cournot and Stigler predict a positive relationship 
between profits and concentration, there may be other market factors that tend to 
weaken this relationship and make other measures of market performance 
superior to profitability (Weiss(1989)). In some cases, firms may be restricting 
output and imposing a cost on society, yet at the same time show no extraordinary 
profits. Richard Posner pointed out that, at the margin, a firm would be willing 
to pay the amount equal to the expected monopoly profits to receive the 
monopoly rents. He assumed that "competition to obtain a monopoly results in the 
transformation of expected monopoly profits into social costs." (Posner,l975,p.807) 
Thus economic profits could be dissipated in an attempt to gain monopoly profits. 
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X-inefficiency is another way that the positive relationship between profits 
and concentration can be weakened. Market power may lead to inefficiency, an 
increase in costs and a reduction in profits (Comanor(1968)). In addition, Karier 
proposed that firms that have market power may share the profits with unions 
(1985). Thus price may be a better measure of performance than profitability due 
to the real possibility that firms' costs may rise with concentration. Werden came 
to a similar conclusion: 
It is important to appreciate that the studies in this category [price 
concentration] are quite different from, and far more reliable than, the 
traditional profits or price-cost margins studies. One important 
distinction is that price generally is the better performance measure. 
The critical policy question is whether higher concentration leads to 
lower welfare. Price is a reasonable measure of welfare in many cases. 
Profits or price-cost margins could be used in lieu of prices if 
concentration were unrelated to cost, but there are many strains of 
literature suggesting that such is not be [sic] the case (Werden (1991) 
p.6) 
The vague relationship between cost and concentration makes price a superior 
measure of performance relative to profitability. Most of the published price-
concentration studies have found a positive relationship between concentration 
and price. For a thorough review of many price-concentration studies in a 
number of industries, see Concentration and Price (1989) by Leonard Weiss. 
Price and Concentration in the 
Hospital Market 
Arguments for a Negative Relationship Between 
Price and Concentration 
The hospital industry, however, may well be an exception to the price 
concentration relationship that is observed in other industries. Many economists 
believe that competition in the hospital industry can be characterized by quality 
competition rather than price competition due to the peculiar nature of hospital 
markets. In the hospital industry, the primary payer is not the consumer, but third 
parties such as insurance companies and Medicare. Approximately 90 percent of the 
hospital bills in the U.S. are paid by third parties (Noether (1987) p.7). Therefore 
the consumers of hospital care may be relatively insensitive to the charges of the 
hospital but sensitive to the quality of care. Salkever concurs with this conclusion: 
... competition among hospitals is based primarily upon the availability 
and sophistication of services and facilities rather than price. This lack 
of price competition is most frequently explained by the current 
structure of insurance arrangements (Salkever (1979) p.201). 
Since insurance pays a portion of the hospital bill, the price elasticity of hospital 
services may be low. Another factor which may weaken consumers' sensitivity to 
hospital prices is the fact that physicians, instead of the consumers, generally choose 
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the hospital. Thus, consumers of hospital services may not be directly sensitive to the 
prices that hospitals charge. 
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In addition, hospital markets are peculiar because they are dominated by 
non-profit firms. Lee (1971) assumed that hospital administrators maximize their 
own utility by increasing the status of their hospital relative to other hospitals. 
The status of a hospital depends on the breadth of services offered and the level 
of specialized equipment and staff available to doctors. (Lee assumed that the 
research-teaching hospitals occupy the highest status level since they tend to adopt 
new medical technology the quickest.) Thus, competition among hospitals for 
higher status drives up hospital costs and prices. If quality competition is the 
dominant type of competition, then an increase in competition may actually 
increase prices and costs. Hospitals would compete by providing more attractive 
surroundings and modern, up to date equipment. Therefore a negative 
relationship between price and concentration may exist in the hospital market. 
Arguments for a Positive Relationship Between 
Prices and Concentration. 
On the other hand, competition in hospital markets may reduce hospital 
charges. For-profit hospitals are becoming a major provider of health care 
services. In 1986 approximately 30 percent of the hospitals in California were for-
profit hospitals. If these hospitals are price competitors, then competition should 
improve the welfare of the community. 
In addition competition among non-profit hospitals may enhance the 
welfare of the community. Non-profit hospitals have been thought of as 
physicians' "clubs". Pauly and Redisch (1973) hypothesized that hospitals attempt 
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to maximize the incomes of the physicians since physicians are the ones who 
control the hospital. The price of hospital services would be set so that the 
hospital breaks even and any residual would be gained by the physicians. 
Competition among hospitals in this instance leads to competition among groups 
of doctors and reduces the total hospital bill (which includes both physicians' fees 
and hospital charges), while the costs of hospital charges are unaffected by 
competition. 
Recent changes in the environment of hospitals may make them more 
sensitive to costs and also more prone to compete with each other on the basis of 
price. Some states have adopted legislation that would promote price 
competition. California, for instance, passed legislation in 1981 that attempted to 
accomplish this goal. The legislation required the State to negotiate prepaid 
contracts with hospitals for Medi-Cal patients. In addition, private insurance 
companies were allowed to negotiate with hospitals to provide health care on a 
preferred provider basis.(Melia (1983) p.789) Thus a positive relationship among 
concentration and prices may exist. 
The Empirical Evidence 
There are a number of empirical studies that may help answer the question 
as to the relationship between concentration and prices in hospital markets. 
Wilson and Jadlow (1982) found evidence to support a positive relationship 
between price and concentration. Their study shows that higher levels of 
competition tends to reduce efficiency. They hypothesiz that competition results in 
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the excessive purchasing of equipment and services which reduces the efficiency of 
hospitals. Robinson and Luft (1987), using 1972 data, find that hospitals in more 
competitive markets have higher average cost per admission and per patient day 
than hospitals in less competitive markets. They did a similar study using 1982 
data and find similar results. In addition to these studies a number of price 
studies have also been done. Kopit and McCann (1988) mention two such 
unpublished studies by Eisenstadt and Klass. In the first study, they show that 
there is no difference in the rate of hospital price increases between markets that 
have experienced mergers and similar markets that have not experienced mergers 
(Eisenstadt (1988a)). I~ another study, Eisenstadt and Klass find that 
concentration does not affect hospital price or quality (Eisenstadt (1988b)). 
Noether (1987) studied not only the effects of concentration on price, but also on 
costs. She finds that higher levels of market concentration reduce a hospital's 
level of costs (a proxy for quality) and have no effect upon a hospital's prices. 
She concludes that: 
The apparent lack of a relation between market concentration and 
prices combined with the negative effect of concentration on 
expenses suggests that the price of a quality-adjusted bundle of 
output (if it could be measured) does fall with reductions in the 
degree of market concentration as measured by a Herfindahl or 
concentration ratio statistic.(Noether 81) 
Since her study shows that price is unaffected by a decrease in competition, and 
the level of quality is reduced by a decrease in competition, she concludes that 
price competition exists in the hospital industry. 
Thus the empirical evidence for the effect of concentration on the hospital 
industry is at an unresolved phase. On the one hand if Noether and the Federal 
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Trade Commission are correct, hospitals are primarily price competitors. 
Therefore hospital mergers should come under tight scrutiny. If, on the other 
hand, Eisenstadt and Klass are correct, market concentration does not play much 
of a role in determining the prices that hospitals charge. It is even possible that 
competition may reduce society's welfare by increasing hospital costs as shown by 
Robinson and Luft. It is this lack of consitency in empirical evidence which 
caused Judge Richard Posner to express his concern about the uncertainty 
pertaining to the relationship between hospital competition and society's welfare: 
We would like to see more effort put into studying the actual effect 
of concentration on price in the hospital industry as in other 
industries ... unfortunately this literature is at an early and 
inconclusive stage, and the government is not required to await the 
maturation of the relevant scholarship in order to establish a prima 
facia case (United States v. Rockford Memorial). 
Hopefully the study presented here will shed some new light on this very 
important issue. 
CHAPTER III 
AN EXTENSION OF NOETHER'S MODEL 
Noether's Model 
Noether assumes there are three categories of variables that affect the 
quantity demanded (Xd) of hospital services. They are: price (P), quality ( q), and 
a vector of exogenous demand properties (M) such as income (Noether 15). 
(1) Xd = f(P,q,M) 
where Xdp < 0 
The quantity supplied (Xs) is affected by price and costs. Costs are a function (h) 
of output (x), quality ( q), and exogenous factor costs (N). Quantity supplied and 
quality are determined by concentration (C) (Noether (1987) 16). 
(2) xs = g(P,h(q(C),N),C) 
Where: 
Xsp = agjaP > 0 
xsq = agjah. ahjaq < 0 
XsN = agjah · ahjaN < 0 
xsc = ag;ac + agjah · ahjaq · aq;ac? o 
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Since: 
ag;ah < o 
ahjaq > o 
aq;ac < o 
ag;ac < o 
ahjaN > o 
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Note that an increase in quality tends to reduce supply. An increase in quality 
also increases costs, which reduces the supply of hospital services, ceteris paribus. 
The sign of the partial derivative of the quantity supplied with respect to structure 
is uncertain because it is not known which effect is larger--an increase in 
concentration tends to reduce output due to the exercise of market power, while 
an increase in concentration tends to reduce quality which reduces costs and 
increases supply. A reduced form equation for price can be obtained by, equating 
the supply and demand equations (Noether (1987) p.17). Therefore hospital 
prices are a function, j, of quality, demand factors, exogenous costs, and 
concentration. 
(3) P = j(q(S),M,N,C) 
Where Pq > 0 
PM> 0 
PN > 0 
Pc? 0 
The derivative of price with respect to concentration is uncertain, since the effects 
of concentration on price and quality competition work against one another. 
In this study, regressions were run on Noether's price equation at the 
hospital level. If both quality and price competition exist, then the effect of 
concentration on price is a vague one. Thus the coefficient of concentration in 
the price regression could be positive, negative, or not significant. It should be 
positive if price competition is the dominant effect or negative if quality 
competition is the dominant effect. In the case of insignificance either the price 
competition and quality competition cancel each other out, or concentration 
actually plays no role in determining price, i.e. if the wrong product market 
definition is used. 
The Data 
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While Noether's study used data from a nationwide sample of medicare 
bills in 1977-78 (the MEDPAR file), this study uses California data for all hospital 
discharges. MEDP AR is a data set that is maintained by the Health Care 
Financing Administration. It is a 20 percent sample of all Medicare 
reimbursements (Wennberg (1980) p.48). The prices that Medicare is willing to 
pay are no longer determined by a market mechanism due to the Health Care 
Financing Administration's adoption of the prospective payment system. Thus the 
MEDP AR data are no longer appropriate for a price concentration study. 
However, the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD) records a large amount of detailed patient data that can be acquired by 
researchers. Unlike the MEDPAR data set which is derived from a 20 percent 
sample, the California data set includes details from virtually all of the 
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approximately 3 million discharges from California hospitals (Patient (1986) p.14). 
The data set contains information that is very helpful in this study: the hospital 
facility where the discharge took place, the zip code of the patient's residence, the 
average length of stay, the diagnosis related group, the expected principal source 
of payment, and the total market determined charges for all services rendered 
during the patient's hospital stay. Thus the California data set from OSHPD, 
which includes information from almost all discharges from California hospitals, 
allows a more detailed analysis than Noether's price and concentration study that 
used only a 20 percent sample of Medicare reimbursements. In addition, it is 
worth noting that the California data set includes market determined charges, 
rather than Medicare charges. In this way, this study avoids any problem that may 
arise from any discrepancy that may occur between Medicare charges and total 
hospital charges. This aspect of the proposed study certainly is an improvement 
over Noether's study. 
The Dependent Variables 
Hospitals offer a number of services, thus it may be impossible to 
determine "the" price that hospitals charge. While some studies have found the 
price charged by a hospital by dividing inpatient revenues by number of 
admissions (e.g. D. Dranove), such a method could suffer from severe case mix 
problems if applied to a price concentration study. For instance, if hospitals 
located in cities do more complicated types of surgery than rural hospitals and 
urban hospitals tend to be in less concentrated markets, then the effect of 
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concentration on price may have been reduced because the case mix problem has 
been ignored. Noether addresses the case mix problem on the left hand side of 
the equation by studying the prices of a number of "disease categories" such as 
diabetes mellitus, cataract surgery, and prostate surgery (Noether (1987) p.2). She 
then makes adjustments on the right hand side of the equation to take into 
account the degree of complexity within a disease category. This study makes 
similar adjustments for variations in case mix. Disease categories in this study are 
defined by diagnosis related group (DRG). DRGs were initially used by 
Medicare for reimbursement purposes, but have now become common place in 
other organizations, such as private insurance companies and health maintenance 
organizations. "The DRGs were developed as a patient classification scheme 
consisting of classes of patients who were similar clinically and in terms of their 
consumption of hospital resources" (Diagnosis (1990) p.3). Mter the product 
aspect of the market is defined, it is necessary to define the area of the market. 
The Independent Variables 
Market Structure 
As in Noether's study, concentration is measured by the HHI. However, 
unlike Noether's study, the market areas are defined by a patient flow approach, 
rather than standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). While the SMSA is a 
convenient measure for a market definition, it has several drawbacks. First, there 
is no reason to suppose that a hospital's market coincides with the boundaries of 
an SMSA. Second, not all community hospitals are located in SMSAs. Only 
about 50 percent of all community hospitals are located in SMSAs (Noether 
(1987) p.268). Thus if the SMSA definition is used, valuable information would 
not be used. Third, the SMSA market definition ignores patient travel. 
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The patient flow approach does not depend strictly upon boundaries, but 
upon the location of the patients' homes for the determination of the geographic 
market. The patient flow market definition therefore takes into account the 
patients' travel, e.g. if a large regional hospital attracts patients from many 
counties around its SMSA, then the patient flow definition will place the hospitals 
in the neighboring counties as competitors. Morrisey et al. (1988) show that 
traveling distances can be quite large. They apply the Elzinga and Hogarty (1973) 
approach, a method that is very similar to the one that is applied in this study, 
and find that Nebraska hospital markets on average "encompassed six 
counties ... and contained sixteen hospitals" (Morrisey (1988) 190). The patient 
origin approach has been used in a number of antitrust cases: U.S. vs. Rockford 
Memorial Corporation, American Medical International and Hospital Corporation 
of America (Baker (1988) 146-147). 
Garnick, Luft, Robinson and Tetreault (1987) propose a patient flow 
method for defining hospital geographic markets based upon two indices that are 
used in the hospital planning literature. The "relevance index" is the percent of 
all patients from an area which go to the "study" hospital. The "commitment 
index" is the percent of the "study" hospital's patients which come from a 
particular area (Griffith 76). Both the relevance and the commitment indices are 
reported by OSHPD. The Garnick et al. approach is executed in the following 
steps: 
LEach hospital's initial market is defined by choosing the zip codes 
"in tum until 60 percent of the hospital's total admissions are 
included." For instance, if 40 percent of a hospital's patients come 
from one zip code, "15 percent from another, 10 percent from 
another, and 5 percent from seven more", the first three zip codes 
are included in the initial market. 
2." .... other hospitals are counted as competitors if they admit at least 
5 percent of all the patients in any of the" zip codes included in the 
initial market. 
(Gamick (1987) p.76) 
Thus, step 1 ranks the commitment indices from largest to smallest. Those zip 
codes with the largest commitment indices which sum to .6 are included in the 
hospital's initial market. Step 2 applies the relevance index to determine the 
competitors in the initial market. If a hospital has at least 5 percent of the 
patients from any of the zip codes included in the list of zip codes in the initial 
market, it is included as a competitor. 
A brief example would be helpful to demonstrate the Garnick approach. 
The following example defines the market for the California Medical Center 
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(CMC), and uses actual data for DRG 373, vaginal delivery without complications. 
Table I in Appendix A reports the commitment indices for CMC. This table 
describes where CMC gets most of its patients. CMC gets the the largest 
proportion (9.62 percent) of its patients from zip code 90011, which is contiguous 
to the southern boundary of its own zip code, 90015. These zip codes, as well as 
the location of CMC, are shown in Figure 1, a map of Los Angeles zip codes. 
Zip code 90006 is the second largest source of vaginal delivery patients for CMC, 
supplying 6.4 percent of its patients. This zip code is contiguous to the western 
boundary of CMC's own zip code, 90015. The initial market is defined as those 
zip codes with the largest commitment indices which sum to 60 percent. In this 
example the initial market is composed of those zip codes listed in Table I. In 
addition, those zip codes (with the exception of zip code 90020, which is outside 
the city of Los Angeles) are shown as the shaded area in Figure 3. 
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The next step in the Garnick approach was to compute the relevance index. 
Those hospitals who have at least 5 percent of the patients from any of the zip 
codes in CMC's initial market (i.e. those hospitals that have a relevance index 
greater than .05) are included as competitors of CMC. These competitors are 
listed in Table II and are shown in Figure 3. The largest relevance index of any 
competitor belongs to Los Angeles County Martin Luther King Drew Medical 
Center (MLK). MLK has 41 percent of the vaginal delivery patients that come 
from zip code 90003. Zip code 90003 touches the north west corner of MLK's 
own zip code, 90059. Since MLK has 41 percent of the patients who live in a zip 
code which is a member of CMC's initial market, MLK is considered a competitor 
ofCMC. 
It is interesting to note that the Garnick approach reveals a market that is 
considerably different from the SMSA, which defines the market in Noether's 
study. The Count and City Data Book reports that the Los Angeles SMSA has a 
total of 45 hospitals with 11,075 beds. CMC's market for vaginal deliveries 
consists of only 12 hospitals and a total of 5,574 beds. Thus it appears that, in 
most cases, women are not willing to travel great distances to have their babies 
delivered. The average initial market for vaginal deliveries is composed of only 
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7.16 zip codes. In fact, 51 percent of the vaginal delivery markets are composed 
of one to five zip codes, as shown in Figure 4. 
To place these figures in perspective, it would be interesting to compare 
the vaginal delivery markets to more complicated treatment markets. For 
example, the average size of the coronary bypass initial market is 9 zip codes and 
35 percent of the markets are composed of six to ten zip codes, as shown in 
Figure 5. Only 21.9 percent of the vaginal delivery markets are composed of six 
to ten zip codes. Over 10 percent of the coronary bypass markets are composed 
of twenty one or more zip codes, while less than 5 percent of the vaginal delivery 
markets are composed of more than twenty one zip codes. The largest computed 
initial market consists of 70 zip codes for DRG 209, joint and limb reattachment. 
The largest initial vaginal delivery market consists of only 43 zip codes. Thus it 
appears that individuals are willing to travel much further for more complicated 
treatments, like coronary bypasses and joint and limb reattachments. The 
advantage of the Garnick approach, as well as any geographic market definition, 
is that it will adjust the market size according to individuals' willingness to travel. 
After the markets are determined, each hospital's share of its market is 
calculated. The American Hospital Association's (AHA) Guide to the Health 
Care Field provides data on the number of hospital beds per hospital. Beds, 
rather than actual patient visits, are used to determine market share to take into 
account a hospital's capacity and also to avoid simultaneity. The market share of 
each competitor in the geographic market is squared and summed to compute the 
HHI. A dummy variable is included for those hospitals that have a high level of 
concentration in case there is some threshold level of concentration that is 
significant (Noether (1987) p.23). 
Ownership Variables 
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Other variables besides the HHI play a role in the model. A variable for-
profit and non-profit hospitals is included (Noether (1987) p.24). The AHA 
classifies hospitals under several categories of control: government (nonfederal), 
nongovernment not-for-profit, investor owned (for-profit), government (federal), 
and osteopathic (some of which were also categorized as for-profit hospitals). 
Investor owned and the for-profit osteopathic hospitals are given a dummy 
variable of 1. The other government and nongovernment, non-profit hospitals are 
given a dummy variable of 0. The coefficient for hospital control can take on a 
number of signs. For-profit hospitals can reduce physician control of prices. If a 
hospital is controlled by physicians, the hospital would charge a price equal to 
marginal cost, so that monopoly rents would accrue to the physicians. Outside 
investors in a for profit hospital, however, would not allow this pricing to occur. 
Thus prices at investor owned hospitals may be higher than non-profit hospitals, 
even though the total bill (including both hospital and physicians' fees) to patients 
may be the same. If, however, for-profit hospitals are more efficient than non-
profit hospitals then the coefficient should be negative (Noether (1987) pp. 24-31). 
Public hospitals may also play a role in determining hospitals' prices. 
Government hospitals provide health care mainly for indigent and non-insured 
patients. Thus the share of beds controlled by government hospitals should 
reduce the amount of cross subsidization that other hospitals in the area do. In 
other words, hospitals in markets with a large presence of government hospitals 
may not have to subsidize non-paying patients by raising insured patients' bills 
(Noether (1987) pp.33). 
24 
Whether or not a hospital is a member of a system may also play a role in 
the determination of hospital prices. Hospital systems may provide the hospital 
with cheaper capital or may be more efficient. A dummy variable for the 
membership in a system is included. These data are from the AHA Guide to the 
Health Care Field. In such a case the coefficient in the price regression should be 
negative. On the other hand, being a part of a system may aid collusive activity. 
In such a case, the coefficient for membership should be positive in the price 
regression. (Noether (1987) p.32). 
Demand Variables 
The level of per capita income should play a role in determining demand, 
therefore it should play a significant role in determining price (Noether (1987) 
p.89). Areas with higher levels of income should have higher levels of demand 
for hospital services, and therefore higher prices, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, 
higher incomes may imply better health, a lower demand for hospital care, and 
lower hospital prices. Data on per capita income at the county level from 1984 
are from the most recent County and City Data Book from 1988. Thus, the 
hospital market is assigned the level of per capita income that exists in the 
hospital's county. 
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Population density should have two roles in the model that have an 
opposite effect on hospital demand (Noether (1987) p.90). First, higher 
population density should lead to a reduction in travel time, an increase in 
outpatient care, and a reduction in hospitalization. Second, urban area hospitals 
tend to attract more complicated cases than rural hospitals. Although the rate of 
hospitalization may be lower for urban hospitals due to the first effect, the length 
of stay may be longer due to the second. Therefore, the effect of population 
density on price depends on which effect is stronger. Population density data at 
the city and county level from 1986 are available from the 1988 County and City 
Data Book. 
The health of the population also determines the demand for hospital 
services (Noether (1987) 92). Noether uses the percent of the population that is 
Caucasian as a measure of the health of the general population. In addition, the 
current study includes the percent of the population that is elderly. The data are 
at the city and county level from the 1988 County and City Data Book. 
Cost Variables 
The hospital industry is fairly labor intensive, thus labor costs should be a 
large part of total costs (Noether (1987) p.92). The present study uses an 
estimate of the average service salary to take into account regional differences in 
salary. The data are are from the 1988 County and City Data Book. 
If any economies of scale or differences in the complexity of case mix 
exists, then the size (i.e. the number of beds) of the hospital would be an 
important variable in the model (Noether (1987) p.93). If economies of scale 
exist, then the coefficient of size would have a negative effect on prices. If the 
case mix problem has not been entirely eliminated, then the coefficient for size 
may have a positive value. The positive sign would thus be a result of larger 
hospitals treating more complicated cases and incurring higher costs. Hospital 
bed size data are from the AHA Guide to the Health Care Field. 
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Teaching hospitals may also tend to have higher costs than other hospitals 
(Noether (1987) 94). Teaching hospitals may subsidize the training of doctors and 
nurses. Hospitals are given a dummy variable indicating affiliation with Council 
of Teaching Hospitals. The data are from the AHA Guide to the Health Care 
Field. 
In addition, a dummy variable is added for those cities that have 
populations greater than 300,000. (Noether's nationwide study used a dummy 
variable for those cities with populations greater than one million.) This variable 
is used to adjust for any case mix problem that might occur. Hospitals in larger 
cities may treat more complicated cases (Noether (1987) p.95). Also, the average 
length of stay (ALS), calculated by disease category, is included to adjust for any 
case mix problems (Noether (1987) p.95). Length of stay by disease category is 
included in the California data set. Individuals with more complicated cases may 
need more time in the hospital and may therefore incur higher costs and prices. 
A variable is also included which measures the diversification of the 
hospital (DIV). DIV is defined as the percent of all of the hospital's patients 
which are treated for a particular DRG. Thus, if we are studying DRG 373, 
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vaginal delivery without complications, then DIY would be the number of vaginal 
deliveries divided by the number of all cases treated at that particular hospital. 
If there are economies of scale from treating many patients for a particular DRG, 
the sign of this coefficient should be negative. If, on the other hand, consumers 
perceive higher quality at hospitals which specialize in a particular treatment, the 
demand for services at these hospitals which have a high DIY would also be 
higher, and the prices they charge would be higher than hospitals with a lower 
DIY. Therefore there could be a positive relationship between DIY and hospital 
charges. 
Summary 
The above discussion is summarized by Table III and the following 
equation: 
(4) P = a 1 + a 2(HHI) + a3(0LD) +aiFP) + a 5(GOY) + 
a6(SGOY) + a 7(MHS) + a8(PCY) + a 9(WHITE) + a10(DENS) 
+ a 11(WAGES) + a 12(COTH) + a 13(SIZE) + a 1iPOPDUM) 
+ a 15(ALS) + a 16(DIY) 
The regression results of equation ( 4) are reported in Chapter 4. 
Improvements to Noether's Study 
While the study presented here is by no means flawless, it does offer some 
improvements over Noether's 1987 price-concentration study. First, her study uses 
data from 1977. The hospitals' environment has changed much in the past fifteen 
years. Legislation has been passed in some states, like California, to increase the 
level of price competition. For instance, "the [California] legislature [has] voted 
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to authorize both the government and private insurance companies to negotiate 
prepaid contracts with hospitals and providers ... " (Melia (1983) p.788) Therefore, 
the current study uses data from 1986, five years after the pro-competitive 
legislation was passed. Second, the present study uses data that are superior to 
the MEDPAR file used by Noether. While MEDPAR is a 20 percent sample of 
Medicare bills, the California data set is composed of all California hospital 
discharges. Thus this new study avoids any problems that may occur due to 
discrepancies between Medicare charges and charges in general (e.g. hospitals 
may try to receive higher payments by imposing higher Medicare charges, or 
hospitals may price discriminate between Medicare patients and other patients). 
Third, in antitrust litigation, market definition is one of the most important 
elements of a case. Yet, Noether's study does not properly define markets. 
While the SMSA is a convenient definition, it is more than likely an incorrect 
definition. Therefore, this new study uses a patient flow approach to define the 
markets. This approach has been applied in a number of antitrust cases involving 
hospitals. Hopefully the current study will help judges decide the future course of 
antitrust in the hospital industry. In addition, this study sheds some light on the 




Equation ( 4) is estimated using the ordinary least squares regression 
technique for 14 diagnosis related groups. These DRGs are listed in Table IV. 
They represent a variety of hospital treatments, from non complicated vaginal 
deliveries to cardiac bypass operations. An attempt is made to choose DRGs that 
vary greatly in complexity and expense so as to explore any differences that may 
exist between those complicated procedures where markets are inherently large 
(since there are few hospitals which do such procedures) and simple procedures 
where markets are local in nature. In addition, separate regressions are estimated 
for non-profit and for-profit hospitals in order to explore differences in each type's 
behavior concerning market concentration. Since market concentration is one of 
the variables that we are most interested in, care is taken to guarantee market 
determined prices. Therefore, medicare patients, whose charges are determined 
by Medicare, and health maintenance organization patients, who pay only a fixed 
amount for a period of time regardless of use, are eliminated from the data. 
Also, those patients who died in the hospital during the procedure are removed 
from the data to make the observations more homogeneous. The care taken to 
29 
30 
guarantee market determined charges, as well as to estimate markets determined 




Tables V through XVIII in Appendix A contain a summary of the 
descriptive statistics for the variables in the non-profit hospital regressions. In the 
non-profit regressions, all of the study DRGs have at least one monopolist, with 
an HHI equal to one. The lowest reported HHI is .044 for DRG 268, breast 
implants. The lowest mean of the HHI in the non-profit regressions is .13 for 
DRG 106, cardiac bypass and the highest mean of the HHI in the non-profit 
regressions is .54 for DRG 262, breast biopsy. 
Tables XIX through XXXII in Appendix A contain a summary of the 
descriptive statistics for the variables in the for-profit hospital regressions. In the 
for-profit regressions, there are several DRGs which did not have a monopolist. 
DRG 36, optical procedures, highest HHI was only .31; while DRG 106, cardiac 
bypass highest HHI was .58; DRG 116, pacemaker implants highest HHI was .89; 
and DRG 209, joint and limb reattachment, highest HHI was .70. The lowest 
HHI computed in the for-profit regression is .050 for DRG 36, optical procedures; 
DRG 209 joint and limb reattachment;DRG 355, hysterectomy; and DRG 371, 
cesarean section. The lowest mean of the HHI in the for-profit regressions is .15 
for DRG 36, optical procedures and the highest mean of the HHI in the for-profit 
hospital regressions is .49 for DRG 232, arthroscopy. 
Tables XXXIII through XXXV in Appendix A contain the regression 
results for all of the chosen DRGs for the non-profit hospitals, the for-profit 
hospitals, and all hospitals (except Kaiser Medical Centers whose charges are 
omitted by O.S.H.P.D.). In addition, Tables XXXVI and XXXVII contain the 
results of a Wald test on the previous non-profit and for-profit regressions. The 
Wald test is a joint hypothesis test which has a null hypothesis that certain 
coefficients in the model are jointly equal to zero. The coefficients which are 
equal to zero are represented by a dash. The purpose of the Wald test in this 
study is to simplify the somewhat cumbersome tables that resulted from twenty-
eight regressions. The sign and significance of the variables are similar to the 
regular regressions. 
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Table XXXVIII summarizes the signs of the significant coefficients of the 
HHI. It is interesting to note that all of the significant coefficients for the HHI 
and most of the non-significant coefficients in the for-profit hospital regressions 
are positive. This implies that for-profit hospitals in the cesarean section, the 
hysterectomy and the appendectomy markets will increase their prices of these 
procedures in the more highly concentrated markets. In other words, competition 
reduces the ability of these hospitals to raise their prices above marginal cost. 
This is also true for some of the non-profit hospitals. The coefficient for the HHI 
is positive and significant for three of the markets, pacemaker implants, 
arthroscopy, and cesarean section. Thus, non-profit hospitals can and do raise 
prices in some of the more highly concentrated markets. 
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However, unlike the for-profit hospital markets, some non-profit hospital 
markets have a significant negative coefficient for the HHI, in particular major 
joint and limb reattachment, total mastectomy, and prostatectomy. This implies 
that in some markets, non-profit hospitals may tend to charge lower prices in 
more concentrated markets. Remember that this outcome is actually 
hypothesized by Lee. That is to say, that non-profit hospital managers attempt to 
increase the status of their hospitals by increasing the quality of their hospitals 
relative to others in the market. Managers increase the quality of their hospitals 
by investing in modern facilities. The end result is that more competitive markets 
have higher costs, and therefore have to charge higher prices than those in less 
competitive markets. These results are therefore consistent with the Lee's 
hypothesis on non-profit hospitals. 
The changing sign of the coefficient for the HHI in the non-profit 
regressions is an interesting phenomenon. Possibly, insurance could play an 
important role in determining the sign of the coefficient. Most insurance policies 
have two components that the individual pays, the co-payment which is a 
percentage of the total charge, and a fixed portion called the deductible. The co-
payment usually has a cap, i.e. the point that the co-payment does not increase 
with the cost of a procedure. Thus, patients may be more price sensitive to lower 
cost procedures because the co-payment increases with hospital charges. On the 
other hand, with higher cost procedures where costs exceed the cap, the co-
payment is fixed. Therefore, the coefficient of the HHI should be positive for the 
less expensive procedures and negative for the more expensive procedures. 
Ranking the non-profit regression coefficients according to average adjusted 
charges yields Table XXXIX. This table shows that DRG 371, cesarean section 
and DRG 268 breast implants do have positive HHI coefficients and the lower 
average adjusted charges. DRG 306, prostatectomy and DRG 209, major joint 
and limb reattachment have negative HHI coefficients and higher average 
adjusted charges. However, DRG 116, pacemaker implants has both a positive 
HHI coefficient and the highest average adjusted charge of any significant HHI 
coefficient, which goes against the above hypothesis. 
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Another factor which could determine the sign of the HHI coefficient is the 
ability of the patient to shop around for a hospital. If the patient has the ability 
and time to determine the prices for a certain procedure at various hospitals, he 
or she would be able to choose the hospital with the price and the level of quality 
that he or she desires. The capability of an individual to search for the proper 
hospital would certainly depend on the type of procedure performed. If the 
procedure is elective, such as cosmetic surgery, then the individual should have 
the time to determine the hospital which best meets his needs. In this case each 
hospital's demand curve should be relatively elastic, given that the patients have a 
number of substitute hospitals from which to choose. If, on the other hand, the 
surgery is required in a short amount of time, such as joint and limb 
reattachment, then it would be impossible for the individual to ascertain 
information about the providers of medical care. He or she, in essence, would be 
unable to determine the subset of hospitals which provide the level of quality and 
price he or she desires. It is in this situation that the demand for health services 
34 
would be relatively inelastic, given that there are relatively few substitutes for the 
patient to choose. Therefore, each hospital would have more leeway in choosing 
the level of quality and price that it deemed necessary, even if it was a level of 
quality that the patient did not want. 
The econometric results tend to support this hypothesis. DRG 268, breast 
implant, is many times elective surgery, therefore it is expected that patients 
would have time to choose a hospital based upon price. The sign of the 
coefficient of the HHI is positive as expected in the non-profit hospital regression. 
On the other hand DRG 209, major joint and limb reattachment, is many times a 
procedure that must be done quickly with little time for the patient to compare 
hospitals' prices. The coefficient is negative as expected in the non-profit 
regressions. 
It should also be noted that non-profit and for-profit regressions which 
included four firm concentration ratios for several DRGs: DRG 116, DRG 209 
and DRG 232, were executed. These regression results are shown in tables 
XXXX and XXXXI. For the most part, these regressions yield the same results as 
the HHI regressions. 
In addition, a number of regressions for several DRGs using dummy 
variables with a variety of threshold values for the HHI were also performed. 
According to the Merger Guidelines of the Justice Department, mergers will not 
be challenged if the postmerger HHI is less than .10. If the postmerger HHI is 
between .10 and .18, the Justice Department (J.D.) will challenge the merger if 
the HHI has increased by at least .01. If the postmerger HHI exceeds .18, the 
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J.D. will challenge the merger if the HHI has increased by at least .005. 
Therefore, a variety of threshold values were used to create the dummy variables 
for the HHI. If the HHI is greater than the threshold value, the HHI dummy is 
set equal to one. If the HHI is less than the threshold value, the HHI dummy is 
set equal to zero. 
Tables XXXXII and XXXXIII show the HHI dummy coefficients for both 
non-profit and for-profit regressions. The smallest threshold value used to form 
the HHI dummy variable is .10, coinciding with the J.D.'s view that market's with 
an HHI less than .10 are not concentrated. For the most part, these HHI dummy 
coefficients with a threshold value of .10 are not statistically significant. Of the 
fourteen regressions, only one regression, for-profit DRG 36, is significant with a 
threshold of .10. 
In addition, a threshold value of .20 (which corresponds to the J.D.'s .18 
boundary in the Guidelines) is used to compute the HHI dummy variables. The 
HHI dummy coefficient with a threshold value of .20 is positive and significant in 
three out of fourteen regressions. The coefficients in the non-profit DRG 116 and 
the for-profit DRG 371 regressions have a positive sign and significance as in the 
previous regressions which used the HHI instead of the HHI dummy. On the 
other hand, the HHI dummy coefficient in the non-profit DRG 36 regression is 
positive and significant. Interestingly, the HHI coefficient computed in the 
previous regressions which uses the HHI instead of the HHI dummy is not 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
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While the .30, .50, and .70 thresholds do not correlate to any of the J.D.'s 
boundaries for the HHI, it is interesting to note that many of the HHI dummy 
coefficients are significant. The .30 threshold HHI dummy coefficient is 
significant in three out of fourteen regressions. The signs of these coefficients are 
the same as the regular HHI coefficients, positive for non-profit DRG 116 and 
negative for non-profit DRGs 258 and 306. The .50 threshold HHI dummy 
coefficient is also significant for three out of fourteen regressions and has the 
same signs as the standard HHI coefficients reported in tables XXXIII and 
XXXIV. The .70 threshold HHI dummy coefficient is significant for three out of 
fourteen regressions. While two of the coefficients of the HHI dummy have the 
same sign and significance as the HHI coefficient in the standard HHI 
regressions, one does not. The HHI dummy coefficient in the non-profit DRG 
373 regression is positive and significant, while the HHI coefficient in the 
standard regression is iq.significant. 
Ownership 
Noether hypothesized that hospitals that are members of a system may be 
able to collude easier than non-system members. If this is the case, the 
coefficient for the system dummy should be positive, and of course significant. 
This is indeed the case for many of the DRGs: non-profit DRG 116, pacemaker 
implants; non-profit and for-profit DRG 232, arthroscopy; non-profit DRG 355, 
hysterectomy; non-profit DRG 371, cesarean section; and for-profit 373, vaginal 
delivery. Another element that is consistent with this hypothesis is that in most 
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cases the sign of the HHI coefficient is the same as the sign of the system dummy. 
This indicates that when price competition dominates quality competition, 
collusion tends to increase hospital prices. However, when quality competition 
dominates price competition, collusion actually lowers prices through a reduction 
in quality and costs. That is to say, if the HHI coefficient is positive, then 
hospitals in that particular market are primarily price competitors. In this case 
the effect of price competition would exceed quality competition and there would 
be a positive relationship between price and concentration. Then, it would make 
sense that the system dummy coefficient, a measure of collusive ability, should be 
positive, since hospitals in less competitive markets would charge higher prices. 
However, if the HHI coefficient is negative, then hospitals in that particular 
market are primarily quality competitors. The system dummy coefficient should 
be negative, since hospitals in less competitive markets would have a lower level 
of quality and therefore lower prices and costs. 
In addition, it is interesting to note that in almost all of the regressions, the 
for-profit dummy variable is positive and significant, which indicates that for-profit 
hospitals tend to charge higher prices than non-profit hospitals. Therefore, it 
seems that for-profit hospitals can reduce physician control of prices, and raise 
hospital prices above marginal cost. The descriptive statistics also tend to support 
this hypothesis. In every case but one, the average adjusted charge was higher for 
for-profit hospitals than for non-profit hospitals. On the other hand, the 
government dummy variable is almost always negative, which indicates that 
government hospitals tend to charge lower prices than non-profit hospitals. The 
coefficient for the share of government beds is insignificant in most of the 
regressions. 
Demand Variables 
The coefficient of per capita income is significant in many of the 
regressions. Every time the coefficient is significant, the sign is positive, as 
expected for a normal good. Higher income should imply higher demand and 
therefore higher prices. 
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The coefficient of the percent of the population greater than 70 years of 
age was insignificant in most of the regressions. However, it is interesting to note 
that it is positive and significant in the for-profit pacemaker implant market but 
negative and significant in the vaginal delivery market. Obviously, the higher the 
percentage of elderly people in the market, the higher should be the demand for 
pacemakers and the lower should be the demand for vaginal deliveries. 
The coefficient of the percent of the white population is insignificant in 
most of the regressions. In the few cases that it is significant, the sign is negative, 
as expected, implying that predominately White communities tend to have better 
health and lower demand for hospital services. 
The coefficient for population density is significant for only two out of 14 
non-profit regressions and two out of twelve for-profit regressions. However, in 
three of the four instances when the coefficient is significant, it is positive, 
indicating that the hospitals in more densely populated areas do more 
complicated procedures than those in less densely populated, rural areas. This 
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conclusion is also demonstrated by the fact that DRG 106, cardiac bypass, one of 
the most complicated procedures, had the highest average population density, 
equal to 2,380 people per square mile, as reported in Tables V through XXXII. 
In addition, these tables show that the lowest reported average population density 
for non-profit hospitals is 1,547 people per square mile for DRG 373, vaginal 
deliveries without complications, a relatively simple procedure. Moreover, the 
DRGs with the smallest reported population density, 3 people per square mile, 
were DRG 167, appendectomies; DRG 232, arthroscopy; and DRG 373, vaginal 
deliveries, all of which are relatively simple procedures. DRG 116, pacemaker 
implants, was the only coefficient for population density that was negative and 
significant, indicating that travel time is reduced for most patients who live in 
relatively densely populated counties and increasing the amount of outpatient 
care. The fact that the coefficient for population density is mainly insignificant 
and that the more complicated procedures tend to be performed in more densely 
populated areas imply that the case mix problem was corrected by studying 
separate DRGs. 
As expected, the average length of stay coefficient is positive and strongly 
significant in almost all of the regressions, indicating that a longer stay at the 
hospital increased the total charge. In many cases the coefficient is strongly 
significant, with t-statistics as high as 37.219 for DRG 232, arthroscopy. The 
longest average length of stay is 13.6 days for cardiac valve procedures as reported 
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in Table VI. The shortest average length of stay is 1.67 days for vaginal deliveries 
as reported in Table XXXII. 
In addition, the number of beds is expected to measure economies of scale 
or differences in case mix. The coefficient for this variable is significant in many 
of the regressions. In the non-profit regressions, the four significant coefficients 
are all negative, which is evidence of economies of scale. In the for-profit 
regression, two coefficients are positive and significant and two of the coefficients 
are negative and significant, indicating that larger hospitals tend to do more 
complicated procedures. The descriptive statistics tables tend to support this 
hypothesis. Table VII shows that DRG 106, cardiac bypass, a complicated 
procedure, has the highest reported average number of beds, equal to 328.28 beds. 
The smallest hospital that performs cardiac bypass operations has 103 beds. On 
the other hand, Table XXX shows that DRG 355, hysterectomy, has the smallest 
average number of beds, equal to only 114 beds, only 11 more beds than the 
smallest hospital that performed bypass operations. The smallest hospital to do 
hysterectomies has only 9 beds. 
The coefficient of the diversification variable is negative and significant in 
two of the twelve for-profit regressions, for DRG 371, cesarean section and DRG 
373, vaginal delivery. In addition DIV is negative and significant in one of the 
non-profit regressions, DRG 355, hysterectomy. This is an indication that hospitals 
which specialize in particular treatments tend to have lower costs. The largest 
reported diversification variable is for non-profit DRG 373, vaginal deliveries. 
Table XVIII shows that approximately 9.1 percent of all of the treatments of the 
non-profit hospitals are vaginal deliveries. In fact, 24 percent of one hospital's 
patients were admitted for vaginal deliveries. 
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The coefficient of the population dummy variable is significant in ten of the 
fourteen non-profit regressions and four out of twelve for-profit regressions. As 
expected, the significant population dummy variables are positive, indicating that 
those hospitals located in urban areas do more complicated procedures. 
The average service sector wage of the county where the hospital is located 
is placed in the model to measure the labor component of costs. Higher wages 
should mean higher costs and therefore higher charges. However, the regression 
results do not show this. The coefficient for this variable is negative and 
significant for five of the chosen DRGs for the non-profit and for-profit 
regressions. None of them are positive and significant as hypothesized. 
Therefore, the average service sector wage must be measuring something else 
besides cost. The service sector wage could be measuring the health of the 
community in a way that is similar to the percentage of the population that is 
White, since communities with higher service sector wages would be associated 
with communities with a higher percentage of White population. It is interesting 
to note that two (almost three) of the five significant wage coefficients are also 
accompanied by negative and significant race coefficients. 
It is widely believed that teaching hospitals have higher costs than other 
hospitals. In addition, teaching hospitals may have a high level of quality which 
would stimulate demand. The regression results tend to support either hypothesis. 
The coefficient for the teaching hospital dummy is positive and significant in five 
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of the fourteen chosen DRGs. 
Summaty 
The regression results are very much similar to those anticipated by 
economic theory. In addition, the model has high explanatory power. However, 
the changing sign of the coefficient of the HHI is very perplexing. It is possible 
that those hospitals who are monopolists in treating certain DRGs may be able to 
reduce there costs through scale economies in a particular treatment. Thus a high 
HHI may imply low costs, and a negative coefficient for the HHI. However, the 
diversification variable, DIV, should have picked up such a relationship. In every 
case that the HHI coefficient is negative, the DIV coefficient is not significant at 
the 10 percent level. Therefore, this is not a very likely explanation for the 
changing sign of the coefficient of the HHI. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The study presented here should be helpful to the anti-trust authorities, 
policymakers, and others who deal in regulatory matters dealing with hospitals. It 
was shown that for-profit hospitals do compete on a price basis. Therefore, an 
active policy to enforce current F.T.C. and Justice Department rules should 
enhance consumer welfare, especially in the case of for-profit hospitals. 
On the other hand, non-profit hospitals tend to compete primarily via 
quality or price in different types of markets. If the patient has the ability to 
determine the subset of hospitals which provide the level of quality at the price he 
desires, then the demand curve for the hospital would be expected to be relatively 
elastic, given that the patients have a number of substitute hospitals from which to 
choose. The statistical results in this dissertation show that in this type of market, 
price competition tends to dominate quality competition. If, on the other hand, 
the treatment is required in a short amount of time, such as joint and limb 
reattachment, then it would be impossible for the individual to ascertain 
information about the providers of medical care. He or she, in essence, would be 
unable to determine the subset of hospitals which provide the level of quality and 
price he or she desires. It is in this situation that the demand for health services 
would be relatively inelastic, given that there are relatively few substitutes for the 
43 
44 
patient to choose. Therefore, each hospital would be able to choose the level of 
quality and price that it deemed necessary, even if it was a level of quality that 
the patient did not want. Under the Lee hypothesis, this would imply that 
hospital managers would be free to raise quality, prices and status to a level that 
they desired, with little concern for losing patients, since the patients have few 
substitutes to tum to. Consequently, quality competition tends to dominate price 
competition in those markets where patients do not have the ability to shop for 
hospital services. In this case, more competitive markets actually have higher 
prices and an anti-trust policy that would enforce competitive markets would 
actually result in higher prices. 
In addition, a number of other interesting facts were learned about the 
determination of hospital prices. It was learned in the DRGs studied here that 
for-profit hospitals tend to charge higher prices than non-profit hospitals. 
Government hospitals, on the other hand, tend to be subsidized by the 
government and charge lower prices than non-profit hospitals. Also, hospitals that 
are members of a system are inclined to charge higher prices than non-system 
hospitals, indicating that system membership either improved the level of 
perceived quality of the institution, or the ability of hospitals to collude. It should 
also be noted that teaching hospitals tend to charge higher prices than non-
teaching hospitals, reflecting the fact that teaching hospitals either have higher 
demand due to a perceived higher level of quality than non-teaching hospitals or 
that teaching hospitals have higher costs than non-teaching hospitals. 
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Hopefully the results from this study will help policymakers and others 
interested in regulatory matters covering hospitals. For it is only through 
understanding how health care markets work that they can make a logical choices 
about modifying our current market system or adopting another method of 
providing health care. 
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DEFINING THE INITIAL MARKET FOR VAGINAL 
DELIVERIES: CALIFORNIA MEDICAL CENTER 





















DEFINING THE COMPETITORS IN THE INITIAL 
MARKET FOR VAGINAL DELIVERIES: 
Ct\LIFORNIA MEDICAL CENTER 
Initial Market Relevance Index Hospital Hospital's 
Zip Code Zip Code 
90003 .05769 Saint Francis Medical 90262 
Center 
90003 .40673 Los Angeles County 90059 
Martin Luther King Drew 
Medical Center 
90004 .12148 Hollywood Presbyterian 90027 
90006 .09494 UCLA Medical Center 90024 
90007 .21542 White Memorial Medical 90033 
Center 
90019 .14073 Cedars Sinai Medical 90048 
Center - Beverly Blvd. 
90020 .14150 Kaiser Foundation 90027 
Hospital - Los Angeles 
90026 .21838 Queen of Angels Medical 90026 
Center 
90043 .08403 Centinela Hospital 90307 
90044 .13640 Los Angeles County 90502 
Harbor/ UCLA Medical 
Center 
90047 .15763 Kaiser Foundation 90034 
Hospital - West Los 
Angeles 
















THE VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
Description 
Dependent Variable 
Average DRG charge at the hospital 
Structure 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Dummy variable for HHI > .30 
Ownership Variables 
For profit dummy variable 
Share of beds in the market that are operated by the government 
Dummy variable for government operated hospital 
Dummy variable for a hospital that is a member of a hospital 
system 
Demand Variables 
Per capita income of the county where the hospital is located 
Percent of the population who are Caucasian 
Percent of the population who are elderly 
Population density of the county where the hospital is located 
Cost Variables 
WAGES The average wages of service workers in the county of the 
hospital's location 
COTH Dummy variable for hospitals that are members of the Council of 
Teaching Hospitals 
SIZE The number of hospital beds in a hospital 
DIY Diversification 
POPDUM Dummy variable for hospitals located in cities with populations > 
300,000 
ALOS The average length of stay 
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TABLE IV 
CHOSEN DIAGNOSES RELATED GROUPS 
DRG Explanation 
36 Retinal Procedures 
105 Cardiac Valve Procedures 
106 Cardiac Bypass 
116 Pacemaker Implant 
167 Appendectomy 
209 Major Joint and Limb Reattachment 
232 Arthroscopy 
258 Total Mastectomy 
262 Breast Biopsy 
268 Breast Implant 
306 Prostatectomy 
355 Hysterectomy 
371 Cesarean Section 
373 Vaginal Delivery 
TABLE VII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 106, CARDIAC BYPASS 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 328.28 103 977 20837.56 
Per Capita Income 14947.06 10346 20157 4373977.06 
Population Density 2298.13 56.80 16282 12972157.43 
Percent of Population > 70 10.24 7.5 15.5 3.95 
Service Sector Wages 23276.62 18207 26756 6026693.03 
Percent of White Population 75.70 59.2 93.10 76.55 
Share of Government Beds .09 0 .274 .007 
HHI .13 .04 1 .015 
Average Length of Stay 13.19 8.35 31.5 10.17 
Average Adjusted Charge 33939.96 19079.56 82027.75 91917341.51 
Diversification .009 .00006 .034 .000056 
TABLE VIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 116, PACEMAKER IMPLANT 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 222.78 43.00 977 19796.37 
Per Capita Income 14342.11 9270 22650 6549128.93 
Population Density 2130.91 18.90 16282 15496405.47 
Percent of Population > 70 10.58 7.5 15.5 4.58 
Service Sector Wages 22587.64 15040 27822.00 7924360.55 
Percent of White Population 77.16 59.20 97.20 88.31 
Share of Government Beds .093 0 .93 .017 
HHI .24 .041 1.00 .043 
Average Length of Stay 5.28 1.00 18.00 7.73 
Average Adjusted Charge 14362.34 4663.00 34249 22591996.86 
Diversification .0030 .00016 .017 4.5E-6 
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TABLE V 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 36, OPTICAL PROCEDURES 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 271.95 35 977 23288.64 
Per Capita Income 15001.74 9917 22650 5360585.82 
Population Density 2380.02 35.20 16282 15959937.09 
Percent of Population > 70 10.47 7.5 15.4 4.16 
Service Sector Wages 22997.42 17693 27822 7418416.27 
Percent of White Population 75.81 59.2 95.6 85.31 
Share of Government Beds .0912 0 .376 .0096 
HHI .149 .032 1.00 .016 
Average Length of Stay 2.68 .50 10.00 2.056 
Average Adjusted Charge 4226.03 1183.50 18852.00 5115305.01 
Diversification .0068 .000057 .274 .00079 
TABLE VI 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 105, CARDIAC VALVE 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 320.92 103 977 22696.76 
Per Capita Income 14875.81 10346 20157 4566581.86 
Population Density 2276.47 56.80 1682.00 13258727 
Percent of Population > 70 10.24 7.5 15.5 4.05 
Service Sector Wages 23044.47 18207 26756 6246381 
Percent of White Population 76.17 59.20 93.1 77.14 
Share of Government Beds .095 0 .478 .014 
HHI .188 .039 1 .0159 
Average Length of Stay 13.60 8.00 55.00 57.19 
Average Adjusted Charge 33343.25 9249 75800.5 111649834 
Diversification .002 .000078 .02 7.13E-6 
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TABLE IX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 167, APPENDECTOMY 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 193.57 15.00 977 19458.76 
Per Capita Income 13999.31 9270 22650.00 6454946.54 
Population Density 1809.73 3.00 16282.00 1237980.38 
Percent of Population > 70 10.57 4.30 21.90 5.07 
Service Sector Wages 22194.25 13928.00 27822.00 8659954.38 
Percent of White Population 77.90 59.20 97.20 91.56 
Share of Government Beds .176 0 .954 .033 
HHI .252 .067 1 .034 
Average Length of Stay 3.19 1.91 4.5 .279 
Average Adjusted Charge 3400.92 1636.52 6143.31 68981.44 
Diversification .0064 .00052 .038 .000018 
TABLE X 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 209, LIMB REATTACHMENT 
NON- PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 203.08 30.00 977 19355.60 
Per Capita Income 14187.11 9270 22650.00 6343719.15 
Population Density 1920.06 6.80 16282.00 13417814.89 
Percent of Population > 70 10.59 7.5 21.9 4.95 
Service Sector Wages 22420.56 15040.00 27822.00 8409139.60 
Percent of White Population 77.43 59.20 97.20 90.46 
Share of Government Beds .094 0 .67 .011 
HHI .203 .027 1.00 .025 
Average Length of Stay 10.51 -L2 30.33 11.29 
Average Adjusted Charge 14141.90 44.~4.00 30039.83 1695858.37 
Diversification .010 .00020 .072 .00007 
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TABLE XI 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 232, ARTHROSCOPY 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 226.24 15.00 977.00 20861.04 
Per Capita Income 14245.07 9270.00 22650.00 6512508.97 
Population Density 1956.36 3.00 16282.00 13848527.27 
Percent of Population > 70 10.30 4.30 15.50 4.08 
Service Sector Wages 22426.67 13928.00 27822.00 8904993.61 
Percent of White Population 77.35 59.20 95.80 84.79 
Share of Government Beds .06 0 .75 .02 
HHI .57 .07 1.00 .10 
Average Length of Stay 2.80 .25 36.00 20.78 
Average Adjusted Charge 3490.10 1078.00 25329.00 10480358.59 
Diversification .0011 .000060 .034 .000017 
TABLE XII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 258, TOTAL MASTECTOMY 
NON- PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 199.86 13.00 977.00 19799.51 
Per Capita Income 14091.25 9270.00 22650.00 6658360.72 
Population Density 1880.32 5.50 16282.00 13393510.35 
Percent of Population > 70 10.66 7.50 21.90 5.08 
Service Sector Wages 22321.41 15040.00 27822.00 8679477.33 
Percent of White Population 77.48 59.20 97.20 89.64 
Share of Government Beds .093 0 .87 .018 
HHI .27 .052 1.00 .055 
Average Length of Stay 3.85 1.00 35.82 6.87 
Average Adjusted Charge 4275.67 1853.00 14222.27 2766402.41 
Diversification .0016 .00023 .0055 9.45 
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TABLE XIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 262, BREAST BIOPSY 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 240.87 33.00 977.00 23671.10 
Per Capita Income 14415.79 9270.00 22650.00 5256183.68 
Population Density 2187.76 35.20 16282.00 14828951.19 
Percent of Population > 70 10.45 7.50 15.50 3.90 
Service Sector Wages 23013.42 16616.00 27822.00 7327305.47 
Percent of White Population 75.46 59.20 95.80 88.02 
Share of Government Beds .05 0 .81 .02 
HHI .54 .09 1.0 .09 
Average Length of Stay 2.06 .14 13.00 4.34 
Average Adjusted Charge 2674.12 431.00 15756.00 4377316.24 
Diversification .00053 .000059 .0081 7.93 
TABLE XIV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 268, BREAST IMPLANTS 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 228.20 28.00 977.00 21788.36 
Per Capita Income 14298.99 9270.00 22650.00 6109874.18 
Population Density 2158.24 6.80 16282.00 15696195.33 
Percent of Population > 70 10.62 7.50 21.90 5.16 
Service Sector Wages 22527.94 16548.00 27822.00 8183158.18 
Percent of White Population 76.66 59.20 95.80 88.72 
Share of Government Beds .13 0 .86 .04 
HHI .41 .044 1.00 .084 
Average Length of Stay 2.95 .50 28.00 12.44 
Average Adjusted Charge 3925.17 924.00 25426.00 8308490.80 
Diversification .0009 .00004 .021 4.37 
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TABLE XV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 306, PROSTATECTOMY 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 249.36 59.00 977.00 26474.23 
Per Capita Income 14530.95 9270.00 20157.00 5669522.93 
Population Density 2301.13 18.90 16282.00 18280623.88 
Percent of Population > 70 10.46 7.50 15.40 4.69 
Service Sector Wages 22585.91 18207.00 26756.00 8378401.98 
Percent of White Population 76.54 59.20 94.70 79.25 
Share of Government Beds .062 0 .61 .02 
HHI .041 .081 1.00 .074 
Average Length of Stay 6.14 1.00 19.00 12.24 
Average Adjusted Charge 6242.06 624.00 19283.00 14253687.12 
Diversification .0013 .00010 .0081 1.96 
TABLE XVI 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 355, HYSTERECTOMY 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 195.36 13.00 977.00 19623.02 
Per Capita Income 14077.92 9270.00 22650.00 6581869.78 
Population Density 1847.43 5.50 16282.00 12935758.87 
Percent of Population > 70 10.57 7.50 15.50 4.34 
Service Sector Wages 22290.46 15040.00 27822.00 8403588.65 
Percent of White Population 77.67 59.20 97.20 89.54 
Share of Government Beds .14 0 .81 .02 
HHI .22 .05 1.00 .03 
Average Length of Stay 4.61 3.04 9.00 .57 
Average Adjusted Charge 4676.99 2563.35 11600.00 1695562.06 
Diversification .013 .00012 .037 .000049 
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TABLE XVII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 371,CESAREAN SECTION 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 211.30 28.00 977.00 21574.51 
Per Capita Income 14049.29 9359.00 22650.00 6787599.45 
Population Density 1583.12 5.50 16282.00 9458602.65 
Percent of Population > 70 10.51 7.50 15.50 4.40 
Service Sector Wages 22208.24 15040.00 27822.00 8855158.62 
Percent of White Population 78.09 59.20 97.20 86.66 
Share of Government Beds .18 0 .83 .032 
HHI .26 .076 1.00 .041 
Average Length of Stay 3.97 2.00 5.03 .20 
Average Adjusted Charge 3564.29 2011.79 6340.40 616622.91 
Diversification .030 .00091 .068 .00016 
TABLE XVIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 373, VAGINAL DELIVERY 
NON - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 206.80 8.00 977.00 21755.04 
Per Capita Income 13977.73 3959.00 22650.00 6800908.89 
Population Density 1547.67 3.00 16282.00 9224537.30 
Percent of Population > 70 10.54 4.30 21.90 5.32 
Service Sector Wages 22125.64 13928.00 28722.00 9250790.43 
Percent of White Population 79.31 59.20 97.20 88.86 
Share of Government Beds .19 0 .91 .033 
HHI .28 .()87 1.00 .044 
Average Length of Stay 1.79 .500 2.72 .14 
Average Adjusted Charge 1457.31 702.53 3060.71 193441.67 
Diversification .091 .00021 .24 .0013 
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TABLE XIX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 36, OPTICAL PROCEDURES 
FOR- PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 167.26 48.00 364.00 5559.46 
Per Capita Income 14303.00 10346.00 17577.00 2631050.40 
Population Density 1323.21 31.90 2715.00 907159.25 
Percent of Population > 70 10.61 7.500 15.500 3.57 
Service Sector Wages 22596.84 16831.00 26528.00 6701516.01 
Percent of White Population 78.50 67.80 93.10 95.24 
Share of Government Beds .054 0 .24 .0057 
HHI .15 .050 .31 .0062 
Average Length of Stay 2.45 1.00 4.50 .84 
Average Adjusted Charge 4305.35 2186.00 7278.25 1995621.21 
Diversification .0049 .000091 .032 .000046 
TABLE XX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 105, CARDIAC VALVE 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 244.667 132 364 6951.75 
Per Capita Income 14079.44 11294 16877 2364492.28 
Population Density 1331.93 59.5 2715 1055883.50 
Percent of Population > 70 10.10 8.3 13.4 2.975 
Service Sector Wages 22199.89 16831.00 24993.00 8798498.11 
Percent of White Population 78.29 68.60 90.50 91.27 
Share of Government Beds .084 0 .36 .0154 
HHI .31 .10 1.00 .092 
Average Length of Stay 13.26 9.33 27 30.24 
Average Adjusted Charge 39798.45 26609.25 62155 100224313 
Diversification .002 .00014 .005 2.86 
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TABLE XXI 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 106, CARDIAC BYPASS 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 238.30 132 364 6584.68 
Per Capita Income 14124.10 11294 16877 2121712.10 
Population Density 1402.54 59.50 2715 988416.13 
Percent of Population > 70 10.08 8.30 13.40 2.05 
Service Sector Wages 22479.20 16831 24993 8601034 
Percent of White Population 77.32 68.6 90.5 90.51 
Share of Government Beds .069 0 .25 .009 
HHI .17 .055 .58 .023 
Average Length of Stay 12.31 8.71 15.31 3.82 
Average Adjusted Charge 37304.16 23136 46889.17 49668795.10 
Diversification .016 .0044 .037 .00013 
TABLE XXII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 116, PACEMAKER IMPLANT 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 131.06 26.00 364.00 4728.34 
Per Capita Income 14411.35 9917.00 22650.00 4021033.19 
Population Density 1456.50 21.30 2715.00 983369.77 
Percent of Population > 70 10.28 7.50 15.50 2.92 
Service Sector Wages 22622.05 16831.00 27822.00 7828271.01 
Percent of White Population 77.97 97.80 95.50 92.50 
Share of Government Beds .067 0 .45 .013 
HHI .21 .067 .89 .023 
Average Length of Stay 6.17 1.00 32.00 21.61 
Average Adjusted Charge 15683.49 3078.00 47786.00 40723303.90 
Diversification .0030 .00051 .0090 3.15 
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TABLE XXIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 167, APPENDECTOMY 
FOR- PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 115.99 9.00 364.00 4358.43 
Per Capita Income 14323.06 9356.00 22650.00 3809741.94 
Population Density 1477.85 4.20 2715.00 950858.58 
Percent of Population > 70 10.02 7.50 15.50 2.45 
Service Sector Wages 22692.98 16548.00 27822.00 7157942.27 
Percent of White Population 77.30 67.80 95.60 84.80 
Share of Government Beds .20 0 .89 .03 
HHI 023 .07 1.00 .030 
Average Length of Stay 3031 1.97 5.00 .28 
Average Adjusted Charge 4075.34 2280.93 8032.88 968206.48 
Diversification .0070 .0011 .042 .000023 
TABLE XXIV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 209, LIMB REATTACHMENT 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 129.49 28.00 364.00 4432.31 
Per Capita Income 14501.73 9917.00 22650.00 3860947.56 
Population Density 1559.64 21.30 2715.00 924812.76 
Percent of Population > 70 9.97 7.50 15.50 2.30 
Service Sector Wages 22800.70 16831.00 27822.00 6716652.50 
Percent of White Population 77.57 67.80 95.60 85.62 
Share of Government Beds .080 0 .82 .013 
HHI .16 .050 .70 .012 
Average Length of Stay 10.11 3.00 21.33 9.70 
Average Adjusted Charge 14821.65 2782.00 30217.67 18094650.15 
Diversification .0080 .00090 .034 .000040 
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TABLE XXV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 232, ARTHROSCOPY 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 134.17 18.00 364.00 5355.72 
Per Capita Income 14706.47 10772.00 22650.00 3399453.66 
Population Density 1609.20 21.30 2715.00 840101.92 
Percent of Population > 70 9.93 7.50 14.90 2.05 
Service Sector Wages 23035.21 16831.00 27822.00 6470326.28 
Percent of White Population 76.98 97.80 95.60 90.30 
Share of Government Beds .037 0 .42 .011 
HHI .49 .091 1.00 .073 
Average Length of Stay 2.47 .500 14.00 5.99 
Average Adjusted Charge 4193.65 1327.00 17533.50 7505697.15 
Diversification .0010 .00071 .0080 1.77 
TABLE XXVI 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 258, TOTAL MASTECTOMY 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 125.62 17.00 364.00 4117.68 
Per Capita Income 14533.55 9888.00 22650.00 3691061.73 
Population Density 1527.15 21.30 2715.00 946396.30 
Percent of Population > 70 10.07 7.50 15.50 2.60 
Service Sector Wages 22720.34 16831.00 27822.00 6807008.94 
Percent of White Population 77.63 67.80 95.60 85.19 
Share of Government Beds .099 0 .50 .018 
HHI .25 .073 1.00 .030 
Average Length of Stay 3.98 1.500 15.50 2.92 
Average Adjusted Charge 5348.59 2245.00 29847.00 8180680.94 
Diversification .0016 .00018 .0078 1.46 
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TABLE XXVII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 262, BREAST BIOPSY 
FOR- PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 128.22 15.00 364.00 2548.54 
Per Capita Income 14567.69 9873.00 16877.00 2588488.83 
Population Density 1755.76 56.80 2715.00 794820.71 
Percent of Population > 70 9.96 8.30 15.50 2.35 
Service Sector Wages 23178.68 16831.00 24993.00 5704666.28 
Percent of White Population 78.86 68.60 93.10 81.61 
Share of Government Beds .050 0 .70 .020 
HHI .41 .12 1.00 .084 
Average Length of Stay 1.69 .33 6.50 1.40 
Average Adjusted Charge 2640.69 302.00 8623.00 2020585.08 
Diversification .0012 .00013 .011 3.06 
TABLE XXVIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 268, BREAST IMPLANT 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 138.35 36.00 364.00 4726.26 
Per Capita Income 14629.79 9917.00 22650.00 4310564.76 
Population Density 1545.21 21.30 2715.00 960155.47 
Percent of Population > 70 10.15 7.50 15.50 2.99 
Service Sector Wages 22734.36 16831.00 27822.00 749662.83 
Percent of White Population 78.21 67.80 95.60 87.36 
Share of Government Beds .099 0 .86 .030 
HHI .42 .11 1.00 .078 
Average Length of Stay 2.75 .50 27.00 11.87 
Average Adjusted Charge 4108.89 722.00 29120.00 12464821.79 
Diversification .0012 .00013 .017 5.25 
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TABLE XXIX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 306, PROST A TECTO MY 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 143.06 52.00 346.00 5976.85 
Per Capita Income 14655.89 9917.00 17577.00 2850584.04 
Population Density 1665.56 56.80 2715.00 846711.08 
Percent of Population > 70 9.78 7.50 14.90 1.85 
Service Sector Wages 22906.75 17693.00 26528.00 6295150.65 
Percent of White Population 75.86 67.80 93.10 71.33 
Share of Government Beds .097 0 .82 .054 
HHI .39 .086 1.00 .053 
Average Length of Stay 6.32 2.00 21.00 11.14 
Average Adjusted Charge 7624.62 2761.00 28671.00 19352965.26 
Diversification .0014 .00013 .0051 1.23 
TABLE XXX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 355, HYSTERECTOMY 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 114.20 9.00 364.00 4432.43 
Per Capita Income 14373.58 9356.00 22650.00 3760181.65 
Population Density 1495.99 4.20 2715.00 925139.71 
Percent of Population > 70 10.11 7.500 15.50 2.41 
Service Sector Wages 22782.43 16548.00 27822.00 7103725.21 
Percent of White Population 77.16 67.80 95.60 84.70 
Share of Government Beds .14 0 .86 .020 
HHI .18 .050 1.00 .015 
Average Length of Stay 4.78 3.00 8.33 .69 
Average Adjusted Charge 5606.57 2481.00 9793.00 1677093.47 
Diversification .014 .0013 .11 .00014 
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TABLE XXXI 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 371, CESAREAN SECTION 
FOR- PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 159.27 16.00 364.00 2685.52 
Per Capita Income 14102.56 9356.00 17577.00 4184680.41 
Population Density 1435.27 4.20 2715.00 1094805.49 
Percent of Population > 70 10.02 7.50 14.90 2.16 
Service Sector Wages 22445.23 16831.00 26528.00 6752081.61 
Percent of White Population 77.85 67.80 93.90 81.29 
Share of Government Beds .19 0 .86 .031 
HHI .22 .050 1.00 .024 
Average Length of Stay 3.84 2.86 4.50 .13 
Average Adjusted Charge 4205.76 2767.60 5919.00 569185.59 
Diversification .064 .00056 .071 .00030 
TABLE XXXII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DRG 373, VAGINAL DELIVERY 
FOR - PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Variance 
Number of Beds 126.66 15.00 364.00 5491.26 
Per Capita Income 14065.79 9356.00 17577.00 4315809.79 
Population Density 1432.21 4.20 2715.00 1102594.61 
Percent of Population > 70 9.98 7.50 14.90 2.09 
Service Sector Wages 22401.58 16831.00 26528.00 6894636.68 
Percent of White Population 77.80 67.80 93.90 79.73 
Share of Government Beds .23 0 .86 .04 
HHI .24 .058 1.00 .023 
Average Length of Stay 1.67 .92 2.26 .12 
Average Adjusted Charge 1531.10 927.06 2974.00 138831.03 




REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE = PRICE OF DRG 
NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Dependent DRG36 DRG105 DRG106 DRG 116 DRG 167 
Variables Retinal Cardiac Cardiac Pacemaker Appendectomy 
Procedures Valve Bypass Implant 
Intercept 5791.68 411174 -2215.41 6493.28 1607.74 
(1.34) (1.119) (-.070) (.979) (1.568) 
Teaching Hospital 308.50 -583.78 -13n.76 1062.41 536.95 
Dummy (.605) (-.160) (-.455) (.885) (2.629 •• ) 
Number of Beds -.169 9.07 -.523 3.74 -.788 
(-.131) (.893) (-.068) (1.346) (-1.764 •• ) 
Population Dummy 1180.44 1351.62 3176.41 492.61 469.95 
(3.49 •• ) (.54) (1.584) (.649) (3.933 .. ) 
Share of Gov Beds -787.91 4622.48 834.31 2852.86 -288.76 
( -.539) (.44) (.076) (1.324) (-1.141) 
Per Capita Income .235 .180 .645 .232 .081 
(1.974 .. ) (.205) (.968) (1.305) (2.921 •• ) 
Population Density -.051 .582 -.207 -.233 .285 
(-.761) (.960) (-.442) (-1.670 .. ) (1.367) 
Percent of Population -39.84 -435.49 -193.77 33.98 -10.68 
>70 (-.422) (-.590) (-.338) (.199) (-.453) 
Percent of White -42.82 -9.64 -33.82 -83.27 -4.32 
Population (-1.416) (-.039) (-.180) (-1.642 .. ) (-.567) 
System Dummy 1698.27 -3384.01 1376.16 3436.48 198.84 
(.842) (-.187) (.087) (2.109 •• ) (.908) 
HHI 1653.45 -11467 -5500.87 5589.86 98.96 
(.983) (-.623) (-.323) (2.718 .. ) (.311) 
Average Length of 1241.67 917.49 2349.29 1131.14 763.51 
Stay (13.169 .. ) (6.64 .. ) (8.47*) (10.618 .. ) (8.564 .. ) 
Diversification 7865.24 -218660 11032 12020.00 -10838 
(1.516) (-.491) (.080) (.091) (-.878) 
Wages -.303 -.733 -.039 -.037 -.066 
(-2.579 •• ) (-.841) (-.055) ( -.201) (-2.489 .. ) 
R2 .67 .39 .57 .49 .48 
n 97 68 69 162 '2JJ7 
• • Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes l-statistics 
- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression. 
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TABLE XXXIII (CONTINTUED) 
Independent DRG 209 DRG 232 DRG 258 DRG 262 DRG 268 
Variables Limb Arthroscopy Total Breast Biopsy Breast Implant 
Reattachment Mastectomy 
Intercept 7052.55 -689.56 3232.47 -1220.56 1482.87 
(1.345) (-.346) (1.651) (-.468) (.527) 
Teaching Hospital 1293.30 -489.67 1215.30 459.63 612.53 
Dummy (1.281) (-1.343) (2.857**) (1.062) (1.173) 
Number of Beds .375 -.025 -2.97 -.536 }.()6 
(.176) (-.029) (-3.297 •• ) (-.568) (.869) 
Population Dummy 1982.00 755.79 451.07 437.11 355.81 
(3.379 •• ) (3.147 •• ) (1.886 •• ) (1.603 •• ) (1.!!81) 
Share of Gov Beds -1750.47 -553.04 104.89 -522.43 119.63 
(-.796) (-.861) (.157) (-.714) (.198) 
Per Capita Income .231 .076 .101 .053 .115 
(1.650 •• ) (1.438) (1.809 •• ) (.654) (1.387) 
Population Density -.069 .081 .014 -.005 .004 
(-.634) (1.876 •• ) (.315) (-.085) (.068) 
Percent of Population .021 39.78 24.24 39.98 -23.46 
>70 (0.00) (.730) (.488) (.513) (-.338) 
Percent of White -8.()6 5.87 -6.02 6.33 -5.92 
Population (-.204) (.357) (-.381) (.312) (-.270) 
System Dummy -1649.40 548.15 -280.78 -48.39 209.68 
(-.988) (2.438 •• ) (-.608) (-.143) (.508) 
HHI -4424.03 551.23 -1443.59 206.10 940.97 
(-2.511 •• ) (1.495) (-2.615**) (.400) (1.590**> 
Average Length of 665.02 684.84 376.70 857.68 698.01 
Stay (10.104) (37.219**> (11.242 •• ) (16.390 •• ) (19.856 •• ) 
Diversification 39869 26677 14928 23327 30659 
(1.559) (1.172) (.161) (.188) (.468) 
Wages -.038 -.030 -.029 .015 -.070 
(-.271) ()-.553 (-.510) (.184) (-.859) 
R2 .49 .92 .50 .74 .75 
n 192 118 193 107 145 
* * Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statistics 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression. 
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TABLE XXXIII (CONTINUED) 
Independent DRG 306 DRG 355 DRG 371 DRG 373 
Variables Prostatectomy Hysterectomy Cesarean Section Vaginal 
Delivery 
Intercept 727556 1879.44 1806.14 656.25 
(1.333) (1.352) (1.452) (1.256) 
Teaching Hospital 53350 662.72 706.31 348.24 
Dummy (.479) (2.336 •• ) (2.782"*) (3.044 •• ) 
Number of Beds -2.75 -1.38 -.949 -.043 
( -1.228) (-2.423 •• ) (-1.830 •• ) (-.186) 
Population Dummy 131150 761.92 383.98 164.42 
(2.189 •• ) (4.670 •• ) (2.683 •• ) (2.409**> 
Share of Gov Beds -1716.07 681.97 -212.30 -18.11 .. 
(-1.154) (1.634 ) (-.641) (-.131) 
Per Capita Income .065 .118 .115 .040 
(.409) (3.214 •• ) (3.524 •• ) (2.619 •• ) 
Population Density -.059 .025 -.001 .013 
(-.540) (.837) (-.044) (1.019) 
Percent of Population 38.34 -44.29 25.21 -1256 
>70 (.279) (-1.226) (.847) (-1.046) 
Percent of White -35.75 -8.40 -18.16 -3.93 
Population -.761() (-.783) (-1.876 •• ) (-.911) 
System Dummy -953.90 670.78 606.26 141.40 
(-1.344) (1.677 •• ) (2.245 •• ) (1.372) 
HHI -2298.22 510.72 622.16 82.18 
(-1.877 •• ) (1.086) (1.570 •• ) (.492) 
Average Length of 914.14 953.60 623.68 505.32 
Stay (14.758 •• ) (11.212 •• ) (4.429 •• ) (5.817 •• ) 
Diversification -162680 -41155 -5853.14 -596.31 
(-.921) (-4.384 •• ) (-1.406) (-.902) 
Wages -.127 -.112 -.073 -.018 
(-.805) (-2.976 •• ) (-2.283 •• ) ( -1.222) 
R2 .78 .63 .40 .58 
n 74 201 157 162 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression. 
TABLE XXXIV 
REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE = PRICE OF DRG 
FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Independent DRG 36 DRG105 DRG106 DRG 116 
Variables Retinal Cardiac Cardiac Pacemaker 
Procedures Valve Bypass Implant 
Intercept 8222.65 -182.37 
(.959) (-.012) 
Number of Beds 3.24 17.83 
(.786) (2.372 •• ) 
Population Dummy -779.89 2092.47 
(-1.003) (1.484} 
Share of Gov Beds 5228.54 -815.15 
(1.166) (-.189) 
Per Capita Income -.003 .284 
(-.015) (.700) 
Population Density .116 .730 
(.202) (.824) 
Percent of Population 117.19 821.74 
>70 (.548) (1.868 •• ) 
Percent of White -61.85 -18.n 
Population (-1.144) (-.790) 
System Dummy -3645.99 
(-.750) 
HHI 3784,04 406.72 
(.723) (.096) 
Average Length of 845.56 967.16 
Stay (2.750 •• ) (8.162 •• ) 
Diversification 27828 75534 
(.639) (.250) 
Wages -.172 .139 
(-.880) (.376) 
R2 .16 .57 
n 31 80 
* * Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics 
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TABLE XXXIV (CONTINUED) 
Independent DRG209 DRG 232 DRG 258 DRG 262 DRG 268 
Variables Limb Arthroscopy Total 
Reattachment Mastectomy 
Intercept 4324.89 -1621.42 379.18 733.63 -125150 
(.409) -.2270 (.071) (.165) (-.185) 
Number of Beds 8.65 .993 2.22 -2.94 -1.06 
(1.708 •• ) (.358) (.755) (-1.694**> (-363) 
Population Dummy -2042.67 67.86 -292.36 278.06 539.19 
(-2.126 •• ) (.123) (-.527) (.765) (.961) 
Share of Gov Beds 105.13 429.14 -1584.69 -201.32 2455.02 
(.034) (.210) (-1.053) (-.234) (1.714 **> 
Per Capita Income .186 -.009 .249 .259 -.126 
(.600) (-.055) (1.493) (1.637**> (-.773) 
Population Density .103 .385 .146 -.102 .560 
(.169) (1.094) (.466) (-.311) (1.381) 
Percent of Population -26.97 171.50 154.60 37.64 -61.80 
>70 (-.089) (.913) (1.035) (.342) (-.312) 
Percent of White -3.56 9.56 -39.55 -15.75 26.57 
Population (-.049) (.198) (-.991) (-509) (.642) 
System Dummy 1719.90 374.78 134.16 
(1.815 •• ) (.312) (.125) 
HHI 2266.47 -363.02 330.80 -320.65 -356.32 
(.596) (-.420) (.247) (-.669) (-.380) 
Average Length of 873.87 949.92 1327.97 908.99 892.13 
Stay (7.870 •• ) (12.187 •• ) (12.421 
.. 
) (9.124 •• ) (15.159 •• ) 
Diversification -17427 -67966 -30478 -41520 -86652 
(-.2852) (-.416) (-.197) (-.526) (-.856) 
Wages .-.074 -.044 -.137 -.080 .104 
(-.282) (-.258) (-.951) (-.621) (.715) 
R2 .39 .69 .59 .56 .80 
n 105 71 113 72 72 
* * Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression. 
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TABLE XXXIV (CONTINUED) 
Independent DRG 306 DRG 355 DRG371 DRG 373 
Variables Prostatectomy Hysterectomy Cesarean Section Vaginal 
Delivery 
Intercept -16165 3789.97 2867.40 4444.21 
(-1.018) (1.497) (1.039) (3.546 •• ) 
Number of Beds -2.95 1.33 -2.09 .140 
(.517) (.963) (-1.655 •• ) (.227) 
Population Dummy -934.57 543.09 1128.12 258.28 
(-.803) (2.194 •• ) (2.649 •• ) (1.575 •• ) 
Share of Gov Beds 1044.70 -673.33 -255.78 -14.44 
(~) (-.965) (-.430) ( -.053) 
Per Capita Income -.130 -.018 -.063 .021 
(-.203) (-.242) (-.739) (.511) 
Population Density .154 .336 .419 -.004 
(.189) (1.863 •• ) (2.021 •• ) (-.037) 
Percent of Population 212.60 55.51 82.23 -78.63 
>70 (.556) (.709) (1.081) (-2.230 •• ) 
Percent of White 54.66 -17.20 -3.02 -18.91 
Population (.396) (-.996) (-.194) (-2.364 •• ) 
System Dummy 1106.68 260.59 597.33 
(.683) (.460) (2.141.) 
HHI 1461.78 1500.66 1715.69 379.49 
(.675) (1.626 •• ) (2.323 •• ) (1.104) 
Average Length of 1166.26 844.10 233.68 33.88 
Stay (9.397*) (6.905 •• ) (.898) (.244) 
Diversification 22731 -7462.88 -11957 -2217.55 
(.053) (-.972) (-2.308 •• ) (-2.653*) 
Wages .467 -.089 .012 -.066 
(1.011) (-1.471) (.220) (-2.555 •• ) 
R2 .75 .37 .15 .19 
n 36 142 75 80 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statistics 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression. 
TABLE XXXV 
REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT 






Number of Beds 
Population Dummy 
Share of Gov Beds 
Per Capita Income 
Population Density 
Percent of Population 
>70 




































(12.604 •• ) 
8584.82 
(1.686 •• ) 
-.275 
(-3.099 •• ) 
-814.83 
(-2.131 •• ) 
552.80 





































(2.64 •• ) 
.40 
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n Denotes a coefflctent that ts stgntflcant at the io% level. 
() Denotes !-statistics : 

































(-2.44 •• ) 
5076.86 



























(1.682 •• ) 
1012.31 





































(12.762 •• ) 
-17207 
(-1.995 •• ) 
-.058 








TABLE XXXV (CONTINUED) 
Independent Variables DRG 209 DRG 232 DRG 258 DRG 262 DRG 268 
Limb Reattachment Arthroscopy Total Mastectomy Breast Biopsy Breast 
Implant 
Intercept 6570.50 -332.80 1070.94 496.98 4429.40 
(1556) (-.172) (558) (.275) (1.797) 
Teaching Hospital -302.63 -247.98 734.21 19.20 867.38 
Dummy (-.342) (-.669) (1.642 •• ) (.061) (1.769 •• ) 
Number of Beds 3.26 -.098 -1.41 -.787 -.291 
(1.903**> (-.129) (-1585 •• ) (-1.250) (-.288) 
Population Dummy 737.34 315.78 296.74 49450 56.25 
(1.465) (1.384) (1.177) (2.483 •• ) (.183) 
Share of Gov Beds 174.80 183.10 449.22 -294.n -120.62 
(.116) (.407) (.868) (-.684) (-.245) 
Per Capita Income .263 .055 .089 .116 .080 
(2.161 •• ) (1.003) (1533) (1.981 •• ) (UJ48) 
Population Density .024 .093 .043 .002 .024 
(.252) (2.124 "*> (.919) (.046) (.411) 
Percent of Population 97.62 39.26 2653 30.05 -88.88 
>70 (.959) (.749) (.549) (570) (-1.358) 
Percent of White -6.45 5.88 -558 -572 -18.18 
Population (-.207) (.396) (-.037) (-.042) (-.952) 
System Dummy -170850 601.01 244.03 -56.90 42.71 
(-1.313) (2.495 •• ) (553) (-.230) (.110) 
HHI -3176.09 340.54 -394.50 -173.75 -256.47 
(-2.137 •• ) (1.000) (-.722) (-.546) (-513) 
Average Length of Stay 618.28 702.64 563.96 836.66 668.43 
(12596 •• ) (33.336 •• ) (14.630 •• ) (20.053 •• ) (22.838 •• ) 
Diversification 29422 14339 -124845 -13038 -39358 
(1.246) (521) (-1539) (-.220) (-.689) 
Wages -.092 -.030 -.015 -.056 -.055 
(-.767) (-.545) (-.272) (-1.041) (-.760) 
GOYCmment Dummy -1500.83 -251.30 -274.89 -4.11 -600.75 
(-2.834 •• ) (-.715) (-1.026) (-.010) ( -1.621 
.. 
) 
For Profit Dummy 1198.86 868.85 959.80 268.01 37056 
(2.862 •• ) (4.479 •• ) (4.821 •• ) (1559 •• ) (1.388) 
R2 .41 .83 .45 .68 .68 
n 357 229 370 206 261 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression 
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TABLE XXXV (CONTINUED) 
Independent Variables DRG 306 DRG 355 DRG 371 DRG 373 
Prostatectomy Hysterectomy Cesarean Section Vaginal Delivery 
Intercept 2723.38 781.40 767.72 1050.71 
(.595) (.721) (.790) (2.609 •• ) 
Teaching Hospital 94.66 485.61 327.30 264.21 
(1.924 •• ) .. (2.794 •• ) Dummy (.123) (1.576 ) 
Number of Beds -1.64 -1.04 -1.09 -.008 
(-1.118) (-2.259 •• ) (-2.703 •• ) (-.046) 
Population Dummy 480.27 762.64 539.20 216.81 
(1.015) (5.710 •• ) (3.917 •• ) (3.501 
.. 
) 
Share of Gov Beds -662.64 63.22 60.06 36.66 
(-.744) (.207) (.264) (.384) 
Per Capita Income -.023 .084 .070 .041 
(-.167) (2.792 •• ) (2.587 •• ) (3.371 
.. 
) 
Population Density -.016 .032 .048 .013 
(-.180) (1.210) (.986) (1.118) 
Percent of Population 8.13 -5.076 23.48 -13.92 
>70 (.075) (-.185) (1.013) (-1.495) 
Percent of White -26.90 -6.74 -6.51 -5.39 
Population (-.706) (-.881) (-.920) 
.. 
(-1.721 ) 
System Dummy 45.16 712.47 412.76 145.97 
(.090) (2.150 •• ) (2.195 •• ) (1.885 
.. 
) 
HHI -827.32 584.70 935.46 177.62 
(-.944) (1.568 •• ) (3.147 •• ) (1.377) 
Average Length of Stay 974.09 973.86 587.22 352.72 
(19.753 •• ) (15.457 •• ) (5.990 •• ) (5.677 •• ) 
Diversification -72525 -18246 -9505.43 -1407.75 
(-.484) (-3.520 •• ) (-3.197 •• ) (-3.205**> 
Wages .0265 -.084 -.025 -.017 
(.204) (-3.036 •• ) (-UlOS) (-1.574**> 
Government Dummy -975.62 -167.54 103.40 -43.01 
( -1.549 •• ) (-1.254) (.904) (-.831) 
For-Profit Dummy 1051.79 797.02 855.25 172.06 
(2.592 •• ) (7.418 •• ) (8.345 •• ) (3.743 •• ) 
R2 .78 .57 .35 .44 
n 130 425 298 315 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from the regression. 
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TABLE XXXVI 
FINAL REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE = PRICE OF DRG 
NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Independent Variables DRG36 DRG 105 DRG 106 DRG 116 DRG 167 
Retinal Cardiac Valve Cardiac Bypass Pacemaker Appendectomy 
Procedures Implant 
Intercept 3013.77 18579 -2982.30 5576.87 959.30 
(2.52 •• ) (5.294 .. ) (-.519) (1.352) (1.676**) 
Teaching Hospital 526.36 
Dummy (2.599**) 
Number of Beds 8.75 5.41 -.755 
(1.350) (2.484**) (-1.703**) 
Population Dummy 1311.73 2436.62 479.43 
(4.505**) (1.571) (4.051**) 
Sha~ of Gov Beds 2918.33 -211,62 
1.375 (-.909) 
Per Capita Income .104 .458 .182 .077 
(1.383) (1.335) (1.468) (3.165 •• ) 
Population Density .326 -.162 .029 
(1.232) (-1.662 •• ) (1.798 •• ) 
Percent of Population 
>70 
Percent of White -72.48 
Population (-1.91(*) 
System Dummy 3463.74 216.86 
(2.158 •• ) (1.000) 
HHI 742.45 -&197.30 -5652.41 5506.71 65.45 
(.700) (-.857) (-.936) (2.755**) (.208) 
Average Length of Stay 1233.63 917.10 2271.66 1145.21 763.85 
(13.611 .. ) (7.302 •• ) (9.813 •• ) (11.155 •• ) (8.715**) 
Diversification 7110.87 -10513 
(1.508) (-.858) 
Wages -.186 -.057 
(-2.732 •• ) (-2.524) 
R2 .68 .45 .62 .so .49 
n 97 68 69 162 207 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statlstics. 
-- Denotes a coefficients that are jointly equal to zero. 
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TABLE XXXVI (CONTINUED) 
Independent Variables DRG 209 DRG 232 DRG 258 DRG 262 DRG 268 
Limb Arthroscopy Total Breast Biopsy Breast Implants 
Reattachment Mastectomy 
Intercept 4112.80 -293.27 2217.30 -252.75 414.30 
(2.644 •• ) (-.473) (3.770 •• ) (-.368) (.505) 
Teaching Hospital 1299.18 -46359 1324.47 333.01 799.71 
Dummy (1.628 •• ) (-1.699 .. ) (3.382 .. ) (1.058) (1.980 •• ) 
Number of Beds -3.11 
(-3.693 •• ) 
Population Dummy 1761.47 695.27 518.83 398.98 359.47 
(3.288 •• ) (2.984 •• ) (2.374 •• ) (1.606) (1.214) 
Share of Gov Beds 





) (1.206) (1.331) 
Population Density .084 
(3.083 •• ) 
Percent of Population 
>70 
Percent of White 
Population 
System Dummy 566.00 
(2.600 •• ) 
HHI -3586.12 728.35 -1251.40 366.26 606.38 
(-2.482 •• ) (2.269*) (-2.860 •• ) (1.108) (1.342) 
Average Length of Stay 671.18 685.30 378.14 848.78 701.66 
(10584 .. ) (38.742 •• ) (11.720 .. ) (17.334 •• ) (20.888 •• ) 
Diversification 39156 28295 
(1578) (1.423) 
Wages 
R2 50 .93 51 .75 .76 
n 192 118 193 107 145 
* * Denotes a coefficient that 1s significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statistics. 





Number of Beds 
Population Dummy 
Share of Gov Beds 
Per Capita Income 
Population Density 
Percent of Population 
>70 




Average Length of Stay 
Diversification 
Wages 
TABLE XXXVI (CONTINUED) 
DRG 306 DRG 355 DRG 371 













































(-4.231 •• ) 
-.110 





(3.139 •• ) 
-1.03 
(-2.153 •• ) 
399.30 
(2.876 .. ) 
.111 
(3.831 •• ) 
-15.27 
(-2.060 .. ) 
561.54 




(5.020 .. ) 
-6834.97 
(-1.688 •• ) 
-.072 
(-2.285 •• ) 
.41 
n 74 201 157 
* * Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statistics. 









(2.293 .. ) 
.031 













FINAL REGRESSION RESULTS: DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE = PRICE OF DRG 
FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Independent Variables DRG36 DRG105 DRG106 DRG 116 
Retinal Cardiac Valve Cardiac Bypass Pacemaker 
Procedures Implant 




Number of Beds 18.21 
(2509 .. ) 
Population Dummy 2112.63 
(1.562) 
Share of Gov Beds 4066.22 
(1.206) 
Per Capita Income .45 
(1.635) 
Population Density 
Percent of Population 587.33 
>70 (1.654) 
Percent of White -55.87 -127.96 
Population (-1.321) (-2.361**) 
System Dummy 
HHI 2537.54 832.80 
(584) (.228) 
Average Length of Stay 782.34 97355 




R2 .27 59 
n 31 80 
** Denotes a coefficient that IS significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statistics. 


















TABLE XXXVII (CONTINUED) 
Dependent Variables DRG209 DRG 232 DRG 258 DRG 262 DRG 268 
Limb Arthroscopy Total Breast Biopsy Breast Implants 
Reattachment Mastectomy 
Intercept 2159.47 -1688.86 806.14 -878.53 682.61 
(.685) (-.855) (.157) (-.745) (1.034) 
Teaching Hospital 
Dummy 
Number of Beds 8.60 2.37 -2.82 
(1.765 •• ) (.852) (-1.886 .. ) 
Population Dummy -2078.08 
(-2.265 •• ) 
Share of Gov Beds -1848.24 1992.16 
(-1.294) (1.665) 
Per Capita Income .179 .285 .167 
(.984) (1.935 •• (2.271 •• ) 
Population Density .246 .572 
(1.026) (2.626 •• ) 
Percent of Population 155.39 136.14 
>70 (1.042) (UXl3) 
Percent of White -43.60 
Population (-1.197) 
System Dummy 1788.49 
(2.021 •• ) 
HHI 2340.13 -258.04 110.94 -168.55 -297.90 
(.709) (-.384) (.092) (-.409) (-.378) 
Average Length of Stay 879.86 955.39 1344.78 902.52 898.26 




R2 .43 .72 .60 .59 .81 
n 105 72 113 72 72 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics. 
-- Denotes coefficients that are jointly equal to zero. 
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TABLE XXXVII (CONTINUED) 
Independent Variables DRG 306 DRG 355 DRG 371 DRG 373 
Prostatectomy Hysterectomy Cesarean Section Vaginal 
Delivery 
Intercept -5194.93 2112.74 3962.02 4563.92 
(-1.515) (2.137 •• ) (3.181 .. ) (4.564 •• ) 
Teaching Hospital 
Dummy 
Number of Beds -1.64 
(-1.401) 
Population Dummy 591.31 1184.27 247.82 
(2.458 •• ) (2.920 •• ) (1.578) 
Share of Gov Beds 
Per Capita Income -.077 
(-1.051) 
Population Density .295 .469 
(2.183 •• ) (2.76ti"*) 
Percent of Population 90.60 -85.99 
>70 (1.301) (-2.930 •• ) 
Percent of White -17.02 
Population (-2.888 .. ) 
System Dummy 617.29 
(2.528 •• ) 
HHI 1069.53 1290.54 1524.36 228.19 
(.711) (1.488) (2.279 •• ) (.784) 
Average Length of Stay 1147.69 858.96 
(11.272 •• ) (7.451 •• ) 
Diversification -11142 -2244.16 
(-2.276 .. ) (-2.812 •• ) 
Wages .225 -.061 -.058 
(1.575) (-1.424) (-2.617"* 
R2 .80 .37 .19 .23 
n 36 141 75 80 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t-statistics. 
-- Denotes coefficients that are jointly equal to zero. 
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TABLE XXXVIII 
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT HHI COEFFICIENTS 
DRG Non- Profit For- Profit All 
Hospitals Hospitals Hospitals 
36 0 0 0 
105 0 0 0 
106 0 0 0 
116 + 0 + 
167 0 + 0 
209 0 
232 0 0 0 
258 0 0 
262 0 0 0 
268 + 0 0 
306 0 0 
355 0 + + 
371 + + + 
373 0 0 0 
0 Denotes an HHI coefficient that is not significant at the 10% confidence level. 
TABLE XXXIX 
SORT BY AVERAGE ADJUSTED CHARGE 
























REGRESSION RESULTS: MEASURE OF CONCENTRATION = CR4 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PRICE OF DRG 
FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS 
Independent Variables DRG 116 DRG 209 DRG 232 
Pacemaker Limb Arthroscopy 
Implant Reattachment 
Intercept -5344.22 4074.87 -463.46 
(-.372) (.385) (-.069) 
Number of Beds 17.73 8.60 2.94 
{2.363 •• ) (1.68 •• ) (1.13) 
Population Dummy 1932.06 -2091.22 451.74 
(1.366) (-2.16 •• ) (.779) 
Share of Gov Beds -599.98 475.24 1483.09 
(-1.37) (.154) (.717) 
Per Capita Income .178 .171 -.095 
(.463) (.553) (-.557) 
Population Density .744 .0897 .395 
(.917) (.143) (1.14) 
Percent of Population > 70 820.69 -16.71 175.36 
{1.88 •• ) (-.055) (.966) 
Percent of White -58.55 .393 17.66 
Population (-.605) (.005) (.394) 
System Dummy 687.44 1147.37 
(.695) (2.39 •• ) 
Four Firm Concentration -263.59 683.98 -1984.49 
(-.072) (.298) (-.997) 
Average Length of Stay 958.73 871.01 942.09 
(8.23 .. ) (7.78 .. ) (12.41 .. ) 
Diversification 73358 -22273 -107310 
(.248) (-.368) (-.591) 
Wages .204 -.0714 .026 
(.580) (-.271) (.155) 
R2 .57 .39 .65 
n 80 105 71 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics. 
-- Denotes a variable that was omitted from regression. 
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TABLE XXXXI 
REGRESSION RESULTS: MEASURE OF CONCEN1RATION = CR4 





Number of Beds 
Population Dummy 
Share of Gov Beds 
Per Capita Income 
Population Density 
Percent of Population > 70 
Percent of White Population 
System Dummy 
Four Firm Concentration 

































































n 162 192 
** Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. 
() Denotes t -statistics. 




































HERFINDAHL DUMMY COEFFICIENTS: 
NON-PROFIT REGRESSIONS 
Threshold Value DRG DRG DRG DRG DRG DRG DRG 
36 116 167 258 306 371 373 
.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
.20 975.1 1747.54 0 0 0 0 0 
(2.13") (2.52") 
.30 0 1228.05 0 -591.78 -780.66 0 0 
(1.64 •• ) (-2.33°) ( -1.6 •• ) 
.50 0 0 0 -665.90 0 0 0 
(-2.06.) 
.70 0 4660.18 0 0 0 0 207.76 
(2.20.) (1.72*) 
TABLE XXXXIII 
HERFINDAHL DUMMY COEFFICIENTS: 
FOR-PROFIT REGRESSIONS 
Threshold Value DRG DRG DRG DRG DRG DRG DRG 
36 116 167 258 306 371 373 
.10 1149.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(1.63 •• ) 
.20 0 0 0 0 0 413.67 0 
(1.70 .. ) 
.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
.50 0 0 681.29 0 0 999.49 0 
(2.05.) (2.17.) 




Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level . 
Denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent level. 
() Denotes t -statistics. 
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Source: Health Care Financing Review 
Figure 2. Medical Costs 
b California Medlcul Center 
1! Los Angeles County, Martin Luther King Drew Medical Center 
~ Hollywood l'resbytedan 
!.! UCLA Medicul Center 
L Uhit:e Meuoorlal Medical Center 
f Cedars Sinal Modlcal Center - Rovorly Hlvd. 
~ Kuisc1· Foundation llospital - \Jest Los Angelos 
U Queen of Angels Medical Center 
l Los Anr,elcs County USC Medical Center 
lndi.cntcs a zip code that is a member of rhe i.nltinl market of tho 
Cnllfornln Medical Center. 
:vi:...p Source: Zip Code: Di1 ectory 
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Figure 5. The Market Size of DRG 106, Coronary Bypass 
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On the other hand, competition may drive up hospital charges due to several 
unusual characteristics about hospital markets. For instance, in most situations 
insurance pays a large portion of the patients' bill, making the consumer of 
health care insensitive to the level of price, but sensitive to the level of quality. 
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